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ABSTRACT 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union resulted in the establishment of fifteen sovereign 
nations and a number of separatist states concentrated in the greater Black Sea region. 
The latter, so-called de facto states, are the result of frozen conflicts that emerged as 
Moscow’s grip over its territory weakened in the waning years of the USSR and dormant 
ethno-religious tensions erupted into internecine conflict. Separatists, ultimately with 
help from Moscow, were able to enshrine victories on the battlefield through ceasefires 
with metropolitan states that have held for over two decades. However, the issues 
surrounding these pseudo-states remain unsettled, and attempts at conflict resolution and 
reconciliation have been complicated by many factors, including Russian interests and 
involvement in the region, national historical memory and demographics, and 
international norms and laws that favor the status quo. This thesis examines the de facto 
states of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria, and assesses the 
extent to which Crimea represents a paradigm shift in Russian policy towards separatist 
movements. Ultimately, the emergence and intractability of frozen conflicts, the results of 
Soviet and Russian policies respectively, and the entrenchment of de facto states in the 
greater Black Sea region contribute to regional instability while ensuring Moscow’s 
continuing hegemony in its near abroad. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Overview 
The fall of the Soviet Union not only ended the Cold War and the bipolar world 
order, it also signaled the death knell of the world’s last great empire of the 20th century. 
On the heels of this institutional collapse came an outbreak of secessionist movements 
resulting in the establishment of fifteen sovereign, internationally recognized states and a 
number of de facto states concentrated in the greater Black Sea region (Figure 1). Despite 
the immediate proliferation of independence movements in the post-Soviet space, 
statehood has not been universally realized in the twenty-five years since the dissolution 
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), especially among de facto states that 
emerged in the early 1990s as a result of so-called “frozen conflicts.”  
The emergence and intractability of frozen conflicts, the results of Soviet and 
Russian policies respectively, and the entrenchment of de facto states in the greater Black 
Sea region contribute to regional instability while ensuring Moscow’s continuing 
hegemony in its near abroad. Many of the issues surrounding these de facto states remain 
unsettled and the region’s frozen conflicts are complicated by unique historical 
circumstances, demographics, and international law, which prevent successful conflict 
resolution and reconciliation. Within this context, this thesis examines the de facto states 
of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria, and assesses the extent 
to which Crimea represents a paradigm shift in Russian policy towards separatist 
movements.  
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Figure 1. Map of the Greater Black Sea Region (Source: Wikicommons) 
 
 
The first chapter of this thesis provides a frame of reference for looking at frozen 
conflicts and de facto states in the Russian near abroad and defines key terms and themes. 
The second chapter discusses Russia’s historical role in the greater Black Sea region and 
assesses its geopolitical imperatives in its near abroad, as defined by its strategic culture. 
It concludes by looking at the major catalysts that allowed frozen conflicts to emerge in 
the post-Soviet space. The third chapter looks at five case studies, focusing on their 
origins, outbreak, Russia’s involvement, implications, attempts at reconciliation, and 
immediate and long-term forecast. It discusses four frozen conflicts from the end of the 
Cold War, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria, and a more 
recent conflict, Crimea, which may represent a significant shift in Russian policy towards 
these pseudo-states. The last chapter looks at the current condition of these frozen 
conflicts and describes the uneasy stasis in which they exist. It also details the legal issues 
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preventing either reconciliation between belligerents or international acceptance of 
separate statehood. It furthermore looks at the cost of the status quo and anticipates the 
ways in which these conflicts will conclude, whether through eventual local and 
international acceptance of sovereignty, forceful reintegration with metropolitan states, or 
annexation.  
 
Definitions 
Frozen Conflict. A frozen conflict is generally defined as a war in stasis where 
formalized combat is halted but the underlying causes of the conflict still exist without a 
permanent peace treaty or agreed upon political framework towards reconciliation. 
Placing these in the context of inflamed ethno-religious tensions in the post-Soviet space, 
an article from the Journal of Politics and Minority Issues in Europe explains frozen 
conflicts as “those in which violent ethno-political conflict over secession has led to the 
establishment of a de facto regime that is recognized by neither the international 
community nor the rump state from which the secession occurred.”1 Furthermore, the 
involvement of internal and external actors in preventing a resolution to the conflict has 
also come to define a frozen conflict in the post-Soviet space and distinguishes it from 
other minority disputes.  The metropolitan states from which these regions seceded are 
either unwilling or unable to alter the status quo towards resolution largely due “to the 
potential backlash from exogenous actors.”2 
                                                        
1
 Mary Alice C. Clancy and John Nagle. “Frozen Conflicts, Minority Self-Governance, Asymmetrical 
Autonomies: In Search of a Framework for Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution,” International 
Conflict Research Initiative (2009): 14. 
2
  Ibid. 
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The term frozen conflict is something of a misnomer as it implies that there is 
little political or military activity occurring. Unmistakably, these are festering conflicts, 
with the potential to spillover at any time, as evidenced by the 2008 Russo-Georgian War 
and outbreaks in fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh since 2014. These conflicts may be held 
by ceasefires but their underlying causes are still considered very much unresolved in the 
hearts and minds of the citizens within these states and regions.  
De Facto State. Frozen conflicts within the post-Soviet space have resulted in the 
creation of de facto states. De facto states “refer to polities that exist within the 
boundaries of recognized, de jure (i.e. by law) states.”3 They exist  
…where there is an organized political leadership which has risen to power 
through some degree of indigenous capability; receives popular support; and has 
achieved sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a given 
population in a defined territorial area, over which effective control is maintained 
for an extended period of time.
4
  
 
However, these polities exist in a state of legal uncertainty and are not recognized by the 
international community. They have no lawful claim to their territory as, according to 
international law, they are recognized as belonging to another legal state. This does not 
prevent them from trying to enter into relations with other states in order to gain 
recognition as an independent state.
5
 
In order to be recognized as a sovereign state, an entity must fulfill the obligations 
set forth in the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States of 1933. A 
territory must have “(1) a permanent population, (2) a defined territory, (3) a government, 
                                                        
3
 Michael S. Bobick, “Separatism Redux: Crimea, Transnistria, and Eurasia’s De Facto States,” 
Anthropology Today 30 (2014): 3. 
4
 Dov Lynch, Engaging Eurasia's Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto States 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004), 14. 
5
 Ibid., 15. 
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and (4) the capacity to enter into relations with other states.”6 The post-Soviet de facto 
states, namely Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and, most 
recently, Crimea, fulfill all but the last obligation. The only difference between these 
polities and a lawful state lies in the former’s non-recognition.7 
Nationalism. Nationalism, at its most basic, is loyalty to a nation extending from 
a sense of national consciousness. Nationalism drives a population to place emphasis on 
promoting its nation’s culture, interests, and independence.  In Blood and Belonging: 
Journey into the New Nationalism, Michael Ignatieff writes  
As a political doctrine, nationalism is the belief that the world’s peoples are 
divided into nations, and that each of these nations has the right to self-
determination, either as self-governing units within existing nation-states or as 
nation-states of their own. As a cultural idea, nationalism is the claim that while 
men and women have many identities, it is the nation that provides them with 
their primary form of belonging.  As a moral idea, nationalism is an ethic of 
heroic sacrifice, justifying the use of violence in the defense of one’s nation 
against enemies, internal or external.
8
  
 
This understanding of nationalism helps to explain what motivated the territories 
discussed in this thesis to seek separation from their metropolitan state. 
Separatism. Separatism is the act of separating a group of people from a larger 
body on the basis of any number of factors, including ethnicity, religion, and culture. In 
this context, “Separatism occurs when a subset of a state’s population declares their 
independence in defiance of the de jure state.”9  In some cases, as with the fifteen former 
Soviet Republics, separatism resulted in statehood. However, the five case studies 
                                                        
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Ibid., 16. 
8
 Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (New York: The Noonday 
Press, 1995), 5. 
9
 Bobick, “Separatism Redux: Crimea, Transnistria, and Eurasia’s De Facto States,” 3-4. 
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presented in this thesis have not had their independence recognized by more than a 
handful of states.  
Greater Black Sea Region. The frozen conflicts and de facto states that are 
discussed in this thesis are located in the greater Black Sea region (Figure 1). For the 
purposes of this thesis, this area includes nations that border the Black Sea and those in 
its immediate periphery, namely Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, and Ukraine. 
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RUSSSIA’S ROLE AND INTERESTS 
 
Historical Legacy  
Since the late 18
th
 century, Russia has been the hegemon of most of southeastern 
Europe and the Caucasus. This area is home to innumerable ethnic and religious groups, a 
legacy of the empires that have laid claim to these lands over millennia. In order to 
control the region after its initial conquests, the Russian Empire relied on policies that 
created and maintained ethno-religious divisions within its holdings. This strategy was 
later appropriated and used effectively by the Soviets. It has also become something of a 
guiding principle for the Russian Federation, though it does not presently lay physical 
claim to territory within the greater Black Sea region, with the exception of Crimea, 
unlike its predecessor states.  
Peter the Great was Russia’s first great expansionist, enlarging the Tsardom of 
Muscovy into the Russian Empire through successful domestic reforms and military 
campaigns abroad. After victory over Sweden, Peter took the title of Emperor of All The 
Russias and expanded Russian rule to the Baltic Sea. The tsars that succeeded him were 
actively engaged in European politics and pushed the borders of Russia to the south and 
west. Within a few decades, they annexed Belarus, Poland, Ukraine, and Finland. They 
also acquired further territory along the Black Sea, including seizing Crimea from the 
Ottomans in 1783 and Bessarabia in 1812. Russia also acquired Transcaucasia from the 
Ottomans and Persians in the 19th century and fought a long and bloody conflict to 
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solidify its claims in the North Caucasus from 1817 to 1864. Further territory in Central 
Asia was later obtained through military campaigns and diplomatic maneuvering.
10
 
While it was conducting military campaigns abroad, Russia also had to deal with 
consolidating power within and establishing its authority over the territories it had 
already absorbed.  
Unlike the traditional empire, most of the acquisitions from this classical 
imperial period were of territories that had formed their statehood before 
the Russian takeover, or of populations that put up fights to thwart the 
Russian advance. Some, like the Poles, had a very strong sense of national 
identity.
11
  
 
However, many of the states and territories within the greater Black Sea region, including 
those in Transcaucasia, whose ownership had just been transferred, albeit unwillingly, 
from one empire to another, had no common historical memory, sense of statehood, or 
cultural homogeneity. Over the course of its rule by the Russian Empire, however, 
“…three related processes – the imposition of tsarist rule, the rise of the market and 
capitalist relations of production, and the emergence of secular national intelligentsias – 
initiated a long transformation of the ethnoreligious communities of [this region] into 
more politically conscious and mobilized nationalities.”12 As this region experienced a 
nationalist awakening, the Russian Empire met its end and a new political dynasty 
emerged in Russia.  
 As a consequence of the Russian Revolution of 1917, almost all of the annexed 
territories of the Russian Empire seceded. Poland and Finland were able to break away 
permanently while some, like the Baltic States, only held on to independence for a few 
                                                        
10
 Dmitri Trenin, Post-imperium: A Eurasian Story (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2011), 20-21. 
11
 Ibid., 21. 
12
 Ronald G. Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1993), 38. 
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decades. The rest, including states within the greater Black Sea region, succeeded only 
while Russia was embroiled in a civil war from 1918 to 1921.
13
  
This brief experience with statehood fundamentally changed these territories and 
created a shared sense of history that later allowed them to coalesce with some ease into 
statehood after the collapse of the USSR. According to Ronald Suny, in the movements 
for self-determination 
…the brief period of independence [was] transformed into a moment of light to 
contrast with the long, dark experience with Soviet rule, which in turn [was] 
depicted as the destruction of the national. Repression, forced Russification, 
imposed modernization, the suppression of national traditions, the destruction of 
the village, even an assault on nature [were] combined in powerful images that 
show[ed] Soviet power as the enemy of the nation.
14
 
 
Shared suffering under communist rule was the rallying cry that later allowed the nations 
in the Soviet near abroad to unify and secede in 1991.
15
  
After consolidating power, the nascent Soviet Union worked to solidify its power 
at home and in its near abroad. Moscow claimed it was creating a federation, though what 
emerged looked almost identical to the Russian Empire, consisting of a large bureaucracy 
ruling from an “imperial center.”16 However, the USSR built its empire along ideological 
lines, seeking to circumvent the differences in culture, ethnicity, and religion among the 
peoples in its periphery states in order to actualize the goals of the Russian Revolution of 
1917. “Under Soviet founder Vladimir Lenin -- and later in the early years of Stalin's rule 
-- the Soviet government argued that nationalism was the bane of the imperial system. 
                                                        
13
 Trenin, Post-imperium: A Eurasian Story, 21. 
14
 Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 101. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Trenin, Post-imperium: A Eurasian Story, 23-24. 
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They tried to develop policies that would transform the multinational Eurasian space into 
a unified Soviet, socialist state.”17 
As the Soviet empire consolidated under Vladimir Lenin, the leader of the 
Bolshevik Revolution and first Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, he 
argued, “…national separatism would be reduced by central Russian tolerance and a 
willingness to allow national self-determination to the point of independence…”18 This 
was largely met with skepticism. However, Ronald Suny writes in The Revenge of the 
Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, that “…Lenin’s 
notion that non-Russians would be willing to remain within a multinational state was less 
a fantasy than another example of his political style, an uneasy combination of hard-
nosed realism and the willingness to take extraordinary risks.” To Lenin, “Soviet Russia 
was conceived not as an ordinary national state but as the first stone in a future 
multinational socialist edifice.” He maintained a powerful appreciation for nationalism, 
even as he tried to subvert it, arguing  
…nationalism and separatism were neither natural nor inevitable, but were 
contingent on the sense of oppression that nationalities experienced from 
imperialism. He remained convinced that nationalism reflected only the 
interests of the bourgeoisie, that the proletariat’s true interests were 
supranational, and that the end of colonialism would diminish the power 
of nationalist sentiments…19  
 
As such, he did not oppose Finland, Poland, and Ukraine’s bids for independence and 
would not task soldiers to forcibly defend the sanctity of the federation. “He was 
unequivocal in his public commitment to ‘the full right of separation from Russia of all 
nations and nationalities, oppressed by tsarism, joined by force or held by force within 
                                                        
17
 Robert Coalson, “How Stalin Created Some of the Post-Soviet World's Worst Ethnic Conflicts,” The 
Atlantic, March 1, 2013. 
18
 Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 82. 
19
 Ibid., 87.  
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the borders of the state, i.e. annexed.’”20 Lenin maintained that the end goal of the USSR 
would be the eventual merging of nations; however, this would not be done by force. 
Countering Lenin’s idealism, the Bolsheviks set up the People’s Commissariat of 
Nationalities under Joseph Stalin immediately after taking power. From 1917 to 1923, 
Lenin’s policies towards non-Russian ethnic groups led to tensions with Stalin, an ethnic 
Georgian. Throughout this time, “Lenin continued to advocate caution and sensitivity 
toward non-Russians, whereas many of his comrades, most notably Stalin and Sergo 
Orjonikidze, were less willing to accommodate even moderate nationalists.”21 During this 
time, the Commissariat redrew borders and forcibly moved populations, exacerbating 
ethnic conflict. Its actions created forced borders “in areas where nationality was very 
fluid, like Central Asia. Most of the modern nationalities that we have [today] hadn't even 
been formed yet.”22 
After Lenin’s death, Stalin took over leadership of the Soviet Union and, as the 
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
he deviated from Lenin’s legacy in regards to non-Russian peoples. He recommitted to 
maintaining irrational border policies and engaged in large-scale deportations of non-
Russian ethnic groups out of border territories to make room for the importation of ethnic 
Russians to various states within the federation, helping create and prolong conflicts that 
are still present within Eurasia, including some of the frozen conflicts discussed in this 
thesis.
23
 
                                                        
20
 Ibid., 83-88. 
21
 Ibid., 88-97. 
22
 Coalson, “How Stalin Created Some of the Post-Soviet World's Worst Ethnic Conflicts.” 
23
 Ibid. 
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As these activities were occurring, other, more subversive actions were 
undermining the integrity of the USSR. The union’s founders had unwittingly laid the 
foundation for its dissolution both through its national policies and bureaucratic structure. 
The protective measures intended to unify the federation of Soviet states allowed for the 
rise of nationalist tendencies based largely around ethno-religious lines.  
During the Russian revolution and civil war “neither nationalism nor socialism 
was able to mobilize large numbers of these peoples into the political struggles that 
would decide their future.”24 The identity of groups within the empire was largely class-
based and strength was found in local and social identity, not in political nationalism. In 
the early to mid 20
th
 century, there certainly was not the same degree of national-cultural 
identity present in the Soviet peripheral states that later became apparent in the 1980s and 
beyond. It is largely the result of Soviet policies that many of these identities were 
formed and strengthened.
25
 
As “the first state in history to be formed of ethnic political units, the USSR was a 
pseudofederal state that both eliminated political sovereignty for the nationalities and 
guaranteed them territorial identity, educational and cultural institutions in their own 
language, and the promotion of native cadres into positions of power.”26 Citizens were 
denied the right to organize within their states among ethno-religious lines while at the 
same time being provided with the means to create or strengthen a national sense of 
identity based on shared cultural experiences. Moscow was strengthening territorial 
loyalties, which was the opposite of its intentions.  
                                                        
24
 Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 80-81. 
25
 Ibid., 20. 
26
 Ibid., 101. 
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Lenin laid the groundwork for many of the ethno-religious issues that plague the 
post-Soviet space. The USSR was designed to be a federation of republics that were 
“designated by their nationality and ethnicity.” Each of the Union Republics that were 
part of the Soviet federation retained some sovereignty, including the constitutional right 
to secede and other symbols of statehood, including “flags, crests, anthems, and political 
institutions.”27 To be fair, many of these “features of sovereignty” were merely window 
dressing, as power was centrally maintained within Moscow. However, this sense of 
individuality and distinction among the republics was institutionalized and, rather than 
pacifying the republics, it incited new or renewed nationalism. For example, at the age of 
sixteen, each Soviet citizen had to state their ethnicity and record it on the “fifth line” of 
their Soviet passport. This further institutionalized the sense that each citizen had a dual 
affiliation, first with the USSR and second with one’s ethnic group. It did not allow for 
the homogeneity that the Soviets desired.
28
 
Stalin’s border and immigration polices and bureaucratic changes also contributed 
to eventual nationalist-driven conflict. “In 1944, in a bid to gain more votes in the soon-
to-be established United Nations organization, Joseph Stalin allowed the republics to 
have their own foreign ministries…”29 While Lenin’s policies had allowed for the 
creation of state structures based around ethnicity, these held little power under Stalin and 
his successors, “rendering [state] sovereignty a fiction, [as a result] many nationalities 
became demographically more consolidated within their ‘homelands,’ acquired effective 
                                                        
27
 Thomas De Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War (New York: New 
York University Press, 2003), 131-132. & Trenin, Post-imperium: A Eurasian Story, 11. 
28
 De Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War, 131-132. 
29
 Trenin, Post-imperium: A Eurasian Story, 11. 
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and articulate national political and intellectual elites, and developed a shared national 
consciousness.”30  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia maintained interest in its near 
abroad but it had a relatively light footprint, as it was also pursuing better relationships 
with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the West. However, the 
election of Vladimir Putin in 2000 heralded a new, or perhaps only renewed, direction for 
Russia, necessitating its involvement in and the directing of its near abroad. Domestic 
issues and frozen conflicts within states on its periphery are one area of vulnerability that 
remains especially susceptible to Russian interference. Putin appears to have looked to 
the Soviet playbook as how to use and manipulate regional and national conflicts for 
Russia’s gain, using military, political, diplomatic, social, and economic tools to 
influence actors in contested regions. The festering of frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet 
space has allowed Moscow to renew its hegemony within the region after a post-Cold 
War lull in activity and take the role of belligerent or benevolent big brother as the 
situation dictates. While its motivations differ in each case, Moscow has intervened in 
every frozen conflict discussed in this thesis, both enabling these conflicts to continue 
while also propping up the de facto states that have resulted from them.
31
  
In Separatism Redux: Crimea, Transnistria, and Eurasia’s De Facto States, 
Michael S. Bobick writes, “In situations in which the Russian military intervenes in these 
contested territories, intervention occurs, not in order to achieve a decisive victory, but 
rather to keep the de jure sovereign at bay…”32 Russia craves power and influence over 
its near abroad, a symptom of a strategic culture that sees Russia as besieged by external 
                                                        
30
 Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 124-125. 
31
 Bobick, “Separatism Redux: Crimea, Transnistria, and Eurasia’s De Facto States,” 3. 
32
 Ibid., 7. 
  15 
foes, namely the West, and will use any and all tactics to ensure patronage. In 
Transnistria, for example, Russia provides passports and de facto citizenship to locals, 
along with other “symbolic and material benefits, primarily humanitarian and economic 
aid… [Locals] reciprocate in the only way they can: by professing loyalty to Russia.”33 
Russia’s actions have the added benefit of destabilizing the greater Black Sea region and 
the Caucasus so that Western-leaning countries like Georgia cannot fully assimilate and 
join organizations such as the EU and NATO. Thus far, Russia’s costs in keeping these 
conflicts just below the boiling point have been low both materially and politically. It 
seems likely that it will continue to let conflicts remain unresolved and will continue its 
active role in sustaining them through maintaining forces in these areas and providing 
economic and military support to de facto regimes. 
 The policy of fomenting division between the various ethnic and religious groups 
within the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union was effective in keeping these 
territories quiescent. Until the collapse of the USSR and subsequent withdrawal of Soviet 
political and military control among its periphery states in the early 1990s, these policies 
worked effectively. However, they did have unexpected consequences, resulting in a 
nationalist resurgence among border states that led to a spate of frozen conflicts that 
remain unresolved to this day. Under Putin, Russia is working to regain its influence 
among periphery states and has returned to imperial and Soviet policies for guidance on 
how to use unresolved ethno-religious conflicts for its greater national, regional, and 
international goals.  
 
                                                        
33
 Ibid., 8. 
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Geopolitical Imperatives 
Russia’s strategic culture guides its geopolitical imperatives and has led it to 
adopt a somewhat cohesive policy over the last two centuries in regards to non-Russian 
peoples with the empire, union, and, now, neighborhood. It is important to gauge Russian 
motivations and goals in order to appreciate its relationship with the frozen conflicts and 
de facto states in its near abroad. Its current policies in regards to periphery states were 
created to serve three goals: to maintain domestic political and economic strength, sustain 
hegemony within its near abroad, and ensure relevance and effectiveness as an 
international actor. These imperatives were informed by Russia’s history, economic and 
political priorities, fundamental security concerns, and desire for relevance and prestige.
34
 
The West met the dissolution of the Soviet Union with great optimism. However, 
few seemed to reflect on how the loss of territory and the dismantling of the Russian 
empire, in all its manifestations, as geopolitical entity that had lasted for centuries would 
affect Russia and its people.  
After all, Russia had not been defeated, occupied, or controlled by outside 
powers. It was its own elites who had initiated the dissolution of the Soviet 
empire and the unbundling of the Soviet Union itself. The central thesis in the 
West was, of course, that by throwing off the imperial burden, Russia liberated 
itself as much as its former possessions and protectorates, and that it was thus 
making itself ready for democracy and integration into the community of free, 
democratic, and market-driven nations. The skeptics believed none of that and 
feared what they called a Weimar Russia.
35
  
 
More than twenty years later, these worries seem entirely prescient. The economic and 
social implications of the collapse of the USSR were profound and its effects are still felt 
within Russia today. Its relations with the rest of the world were similarly affected.  
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After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation needed to create entirely 
new foreign and security policies towards the post-Soviet states, policies that would 
theoretically be much less aggressive and imperialistic than those of the Soviet Union.
36
 
While doing this, it also attempted to reconcile and reconnect with the West, something 
that was not universally accepted in Moscow. Many in Russia believed that the post-
Soviet space lay within Moscow’s sphere of influence and that hegemony over periphery 
states was vital to Russian interests. As Russia has historically played a unique role in 
these regions, the argument went, it therefore had both rights and responsibilities towards 
them.
37
  
After 1991, Russia laid out a number of imperatives intended to make it feel 
secure as it engaged in rapprochement with the West. First, Moscow maintained that it 
was essential that it became the chief intermediary between post-Soviet states and the rest 
of the world. Second, it did not want any country, especially the United States, or 
regional or international organizations, especially NATO or the EU, to gain a foothold in 
the region and thereby challenge Russia’s position of influence. Third, it wanted to 
prevent any threats to Russian security or influence within these nations. Fourth, it sought 
to establish itself as the primary peacemaker and peacekeeper. Finally, it wanted to 
maintain predominant economic influence without contributing financially to the same 
extent the Soviet Union did.
38
  
This perspective was articulated again on January 25, 1993 when the Russian 
Foreign Ministry outlined its foreign policy agenda in the “Concept of Foreign Policy of 
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the Russian Federation,” which argued for the need to protect its near abroad and assume 
responsibility “for ensuring stability and human rights and freedoms in the space of the 
former U.S.S.R.,” including guaranteeing “the protection of rights of Russian citizens 
living outside the limits of the Federation.”39 This commitment to the periphery states 
was redoubled in a November 1993 military doctrine that emphasized the need for Russia 
to protect Russians outside of its sovereign political territory and allowed for it to deploy 
troops without international appeal or approval.
40
  
Moscow perceives its near abroad as within its exclusive sphere of influence and 
has acted in many of the separatist conflicts within sovereign states on its periphery. 
Russia believes that it needs to provide stability to its southern flank and underbelly 
through expansion and consolidation of Russian influence at expense of other 
international actors. However, the application of its guiding principles towards separatist 
movements has been contradictory. For example, it conducted military operations against 
one of the first post-Soviet separatist movements in Chechnya in 1994. Unlike the other 
conflicts in this thesis, Chechnya is located within Transcaucasia in Russia. Moscow’s 
actions, coming at great economic, political, and human cost, were taken to prevent the 
Muslim republic’s bid for independence and sought to definitively quell the separatist 
movement there. Moscow explained that it acted to maintain territorial integrity in the 
North Caucasus due to a fear of rising Islamic fundamentalism
41
 However, these actions 
notwithstanding, its intervention in separatist conflicts in the greater region over the last 
twenty-five years have not only been defensive and have frequently occurred as a means 
to sustain, rather than subdue, separatist movements.  
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Russian policy to reassert hegemony has been met with mixed success. Belarus, 
Tajikistan, and Armenia maintain close military and economic ties with Russia. However, 
many other former Soviet states have actively worked to distance themselves from 
Moscow. This has been met by pushback within Russia. The states in its near abroad 
were part of Russia’s imperial holdings well before the 20th century. As such, according 
to Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Lowell H. Schwartz, and Catherine Yusupov in Russian 
Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications, 
Many Russians therefore see these countries as natural partners and allies that are 
crucial to Russia’s national interests. A Russia without significant influence in 
these countries is less of a descendent of Imperial and Soviet Russia, and is thus 
less well aligned with Russians’ view of their nation and its global role. The 
refusal of most neighboring post-Soviet countries to align readily and fully with 
Russia challenges Russia’s ability to present itself as a global leader, and this 
challenge is perhaps more significant at home than abroad. Any country that 
makes inroads into this region and builds ties with these countries is seen as doing 
so at Russia’s expense.42  
 
Its goals have often put it at odds with its former assets. This is not a unique 
phenomenon.  
While post-imperial cores are concerned with compensating for their diminished 
security, wealth, and assets, post-imperial peripheries are primarily interested in 
rapidly creating new national-level institutions to control and manage their newly 
bound territory and possessions… In collapsed multinational empires such 
structural dynamics will also set into motion a neoimperialist national drive by 
post-imperial core elites that conflicts with the nation-building agenda of post-
imperial peripheral elites.
43
  
 
This “drive” lay somewhat dormant throughout the 1990s but has resurfaced again since 
2008 as the Russian Federation tries to reassert itself and challenge post-Cold War 
international boundaries and norms.  
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Perceived betrayals by NATO and the West in the 1990s and Russia’s own 
internationally condemned actions against Estonia in 2007, Georgia in 2008, and Ukraine 
in 2014 has brought relations between Russia and the West to Cold War-level lows. 
Oliker, et al. notes that:  
Given the last 200 years or so of Russian history, an outside observer might argue 
that Russia is remarkably secure. No foreign state is poised to invade it militarily. 
No enemies are plotting imminent attack. Historically high rates of economic 
growth persisted for nearly a decade, making Russians substantially wealthier 
than anyone imagined they could become in the aftermath of the 1998 economic 
crash.
44
  
 
However, it is clear by public and private statements that Russia feels threatened by the 
United States and NATO and considers them to be one of the gravest threats to the 
Russian Federation.  
Until recently, Russia seemed uneager to use force to assert its will in its near 
abroad. It relied mostly on economic and soft power maneuvering along with threats and 
blackmail. This changed with the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. Moscow claims its actions 
were defensive and intended to deter Georgia from adventurism in its separatist regions. 
Despite Russia’s reasoning, it clearly showed a renewed willingness by Moscow to resort 
to force.
45
 Indeed, “Russia’s counterattack was the first case of Moscow using force 
against a foreign adversary and invading a neighboring country since the Afghan war 
(1979–1989).”46 
Following this in 2009, Russia adopted its most aggressive and proactive military 
doctrine since the 1970s. In it, Russia rejects American global hegemony and lays out 
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five guiding principles for military actions. Then-Russian President Dmitri Medvedev 
stated:  
‘…protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an 
unquestionable priority for our country. Our foreign policy decisions will be 
based on this need. We will also protect the interests of our business community 
abroad. It should be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts 
committed against us.’47 
 
It is also made clear that Russia perceives that is has “privileged interests” in regions that 
share historical ties with Moscow.
48
 
Adding to the complexity of this doctrine is the fact that Moscow is blurring the 
definition of citizenship. Russia has a long-standing policy of supplying passports to 
people living within unrecognized de facto states among its near abroad. According to 
Jim Nichol of the Congressional Research Service, “Of some 200,000 people in 
Abkhazia, 150,000 became Russian citizens; so did 100,000 of 600,000 residents of 
Transnistria… The number of people in Crimea (population: just under 2 million) who 
hold such passports is estimated to be 60,000.”49 The creation of new pseudo-citizens 
means that any conflicts in these areas would affect thousands of Russian passport 
holders, thereby fulfilling Moscow’s benchmark for intervention.  
Russia also maintains a military presence in the states on its periphery that are 
locked in frozen conflicts. This includes “thousands of military base personnel, border 
troops, and…peacekeepers.”50 This was authorized by the creation of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) Collective Security Treaty in 1992, which “pledged members 
to consult in the event of a threat to one or several members, and to provide mutual aid if 
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attacked.” This was reiterated in 2002 among the members of the successor Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Its members currently include Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan.
51
  
Fundamentally, the shock of the Soviet Union’s collapse is still instilled in 
Russian memory. While it does not seek a renewal of its former imperial glory, Russia is 
still driven by its past, perennial fears and insecurities, and desire for recognition. As 
Russian scholar Dmitri Trenin explains,  
In place of a historical empire and politico-military superpower status, Russia 
seeks to establish itself as a great power. In the eyes of Russia’s leaders, this 
means Moscow’s strategic independence from the principal centers of power in 
the new century: America and China. Shaping a new role after an imperial decline 
and fall is not easy... Performing the same feat without pooling sovereignty with 
others is virtually unprecedented.
52
 
 
Russia’s desire to reassert its hegemony through exploitation of regional conflicts among 
its near abroad is better understood when considered in this context. 
 
Catalyst 
The weakening of the Soviet Union in the 1980s allowed for a resurgence of 
ethno-religious and nationalist movements within the Union Republics. While these 
tensions had existed since the federation was created, it started becoming a serious 
problem for Moscow in the 1980s. The rise of nationalist movements came at a time 
when there was a seeming retreat of leadership and authority from Moscow and a 
perceived lack of will to impose its power through force. Central leadership was too late 
in realizing the dangers that its ethnic policies had created. “The Soviet state’s deeply 
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contradictory policy nourished the cultural uniqueness of distinct peoples. It thereby 
increased ethnic solidarity and national consciousness in the non-Russian republics, even 
as it frustrated full articulation of a national agenda by requiring conformity to an 
imposed political order.”53 The non-Russian minorities long buried within separate 
republics still felt a sense of unity that would coalesce into a desire for statehood distinct 
both from the Soviet Union and from the republic within which they were, in their eyes, 
arbitrarily bound.  
The specific legacies of Soviet rule were instrumental to the emergence of frozen 
conflicts and de facto states in the greater Black Sea region. The nature of Soviet 
federalism shaped “understandings of ethnicity and power in the late 1980s and 1990s 
across the post-Soviet space.”54 Stalin codified the idea that ethnicity and territory were 
inherently linked. In this way, ethnicity was territorialized. This prevented the Soviet 
Union from assimilating its many ethnic groups under one banner and instead the Soviet 
Union became a nursery of new states. “In general, the consequences of Soviet ethnic and 
nationality policy turned out to be a sort of time-bomb that tended to explode exactly at 
the moment when ambitious nation-state-designers crossed, or were about to cross, 
specific red lines.”55 These trends, which began under Lenin and continued through the 
early years of Stalin’s rule, helped consolidate the idea of national identity among the 
Union Republics by allowing and indeed supporting the teaching of “native languages, 
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creating national intelligentsia and political elite, and formally institutionalizing ethnicity 
in state apparatus.”56  
As the Soviet Union weakened, groups that had long felt marginalized looked to 
ethnic ties to mobilize and seek political sovereignty. “The legacy of the Soviet 
experience was that group rights had to be territorialized to mean anything.”57 Moscow 
had allowed these different groups to maintain their autonomy while not allowing them 
any meaningful political power. The existence of separate, completely autonomous 
regions within the different Soviet Republics led to internal conflicts that were further 
exacerbated when the Soviet Union finally collapsed, leading to conflict and separatism.  
The Soviet Union had furthermore provided the means for these territories to 
claim their sovereignty. “The existing structures of autonomy gave these peoples ready-
made institution to wield against the capitals of the metropolitan states in which they 
lived; elected parliaments, executive agencies, police forces, universities, and all the 
trappings of sovereignty were mobilized in the pursuit of independence.”58 
While these institutions were in line with the Soviet Union’s original intent of 
creating a state that had evolved beyond nationalism, it instead, “had in fact created a set 
of institutions and initiated processes that fostered the development of conscious, secular, 
politically mobilizable nationalities.”59 The USSR likely should have recognized the 
paradoxes inherent in its organization decades earlier, as they increasingly found 
themselves vulnerable to its contradictions. “The explosive power of national 
identification and the reluctance of the Soviet government to push too hard against it was 
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demonstrated vividly” in a number of circumstances, including in Georgia in 1978 when 
nationalists fought to keep Georgian Kartuli as the national language. At this time, anti-
Russian rhetoric was not met with punishment.
60
 Other would-be separatists did not 
overlook Moscow’s reluctance or inability to act decisively in this situation.  
Increasing displays of nationalism in the 1970s and 1980s surprised Soviet and 
Western scholars, who had largely come to believe that “…the Soviet state had 
effectively subdued and integrated the nationalities into the general project of social 
transformation.” It was expected that even ethnic non-Russians would choose to 
assimilate into Soviet culture. It was only after fifty years that they began to recognize 
“the deeply contradictory policies and processes that were creating new capacities for 
resistance to the creation of a single sovetskii narod (Soviet people).”61 
The Soviet Union attempted to institutionalize and thereby neuter nationalist 
tendencies in their attempt to legitimize a state based on socialist and communist 
ideology rather than cultural identity. However, nationalism instead became a source of 
opposition in the waning decades of the USSR. By 1989, the republics of the Soviet 
Union had tied their desire for freedom to their desire for national sovereignty. “In this 
sense, 1989 in Eastern Europe was not merely a series of revolts against communism as a 
repressive political and social system; it was also a series of national revolts against 
Soviet domination…”62 
Furthermore, according to Dov Lynch, “perestroika had a catalyzing effect in 
each of the conflicts. The collapse of the centralizing and coercive power of the 
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Communist Party, combined with the introduction of glasnost and limited free elections, 
allowed new political arenas to open, which became theatres in some cases for nationalist 
and ethnic mobilization.”63 As the last General Secretary of the Soviet Unions, Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s attempted transformation of the Soviet system was the ultimate spark that 
ignited today’s frozen conflicts. Separatist regions were finally allowed to give voice to 
their issues and mobilize politically. This, coupled with rising fears of ultra-nationalist 
metropolitan states and the availability of Soviet weapons and troops, allowed separatists 
in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Ukraine to take hold of their destinies and declare 
independence.
64
 
The power vacuum that emerged after the Soviet Union’s collapse allowed for the 
forcible attempts by many groups to seize power and territory to ensure political self-
determination. After the fall of the Soviet Union, there were “164 ethno-territorial 
conflicts within its territory.”65 Amazingly, except for the conflict between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, and the recent 
Crimean conflict, “there were no major wars among the Soviet successor states.” The 
conflicts that arose were largely internecine, occurring between groups within a 
country.
66
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After 1991, the newly sovereign former Soviet republics were loathe to give up 
any of their restored political power as they believed that separatist movements within 
their territories were part of Soviet and later Russian strategy to weaken the states along 
its periphery. The autonomous separatist regions that emerged after the Cold War were 
also mistrustful of the former Soviet states and international system. “The [state] 
recognition process as a whole was regarded as arbitrary and, worse, as deeply unjust.”67 
To these regions, the boundaries that had been subjectively drawn by the Soviets and 
which had been legitimized by the international community followed the “principles of 
political expediency and divide and rule” and had no “consideration for the long-term 
viability of these units.”68 Indeed, many of the borders drawn by Moscow early in the 20th 
century had purposefully divided ethnic groups into different republics, intended to 
weaken these groups.  
It is in this convoluted environment that the frozen conflicts and de facto states 
discussed in this thesis emerged, with the exception of Crimea. The inherent policies and 
structures of the Soviet Union, coupled with the weakening and eventual breakup of the 
USSR, fostered antipathy between the peoples of these states and provided the catalyst 
for secession.  
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CASE STUDIES 
 
Abkhazia 
Origin. The Republic of Georgia (Figure 2) is engaged in two frozen conflicts 
with de facto states located within its sovereign territory. The first emerged in Abkhazia 
where deep-seated ethnic and historical tensions preempted separation between Tbilisi 
and Sukhumi. These issues were compounded by Soviet and Russian policymaking and 
the actions of both Georgian and Abkhaz nationalist movements of the 1980s and 
1990s.
69
  
 
 
Figure 2. Map of Georgia Showing Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Adjara (Source: CIA 
World Factbook) 
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The Abkhaz are a distinct ethnic group separate from other ethnic Georgians that 
are the descendants of the Circassians, Turkic peoples from the North Caucasus.
70
 During 
the Soviet era, Abkhazia was a relatively prosperous region. Located on the Black Sea in 
Georgia’s northwest, it was a popular vacation spot for Moscow’s elites.71 According to 
the last Soviet census, held in 1989, the population of the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic (ASSR) was around 525,000, accounting for almost ten percent of 
Soviet Georgia’s population. Of these, 45.7% were ethnic Georgians, 17.8% were 
Abkhazians, 14.6% were Armenians, 14.3% were Russians, and 2.8% were Greeks.
72
 
During the conflict between Tbilisi and Sukhumi, the Abkhazians, despite not having a 
majority in the region, were able to hold off the Georgian military and, since 1994, have 
claimed de facto statehood. Unlike Georgia’s other frozen conflict in South Ossetia, 
Abkhazia’s stated end goal is independent political sovereignty.73 
Abkhazia historically served as a buffer zone between the Russian Empire and 
Ottoman Empire in the 18
th
 and early 19
th
 centuries. After the Russian Revolution in 
1917, Georgia, including Abkhazia, was granted independence and in 1921 Abkhazia was 
granted a short-lived independence from Georgia.  
By the end of 1921, the Bolshevik Red Army reasserted control over the Caucasus 
and Abkhazia became a Union Republic of the USSR. In 1931, Stalin incorporated the 
region into the Transcaucasian Federation, which included Azerbaijan, Armenia, and 
Georgia. When the federation dissolved in 1938, Abkhazia was attached to the Georgian 
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Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) as an autonomous region, a downgrade from its previous 
status as a Union Republic.  
The Soviets maintained control of the region and encouraged migration of non-
Abkhaz into the region, “in order to make the Abkhaz a minority within their own 
homeland.”74 Tbilisi also pursued policies independent of Moscow to ensure that Abkhaz 
nationalism was kept repressed. These actions contributed to Abkhazian discontent as 
they felt they had been arbitrarily annexed and forced into political subordination to 
Georgia. This anger grew throughout the Soviet period.
75
 “As Georgian nationalism 
flourished in the late 1980s, the Abkhaz population, and especially a section of the local 
elites, became increasingly restive, fearing their possible cultural and ethnic 
disappearance within Georgia.”76 Under the auspices of glasnost, the Abkhaz began to 
call for independence.
77
 
Seeing an opportunity provided by the weakening of the Kremlin’s military reach 
and attempts at political and economic liberalization throughout the Soviet Union in the 
1980s, Abkhazia acted.
78
 Initially, leaders only wanted Abkhazia to regain its Union 
Republic status as the Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia. However, as Soviet power 
continued to wane, Abkhazia became fearful of what actions Tbilisi would take when left 
unchecked by Moscow. Abkhazian leadership changed tactics and warned Gorbachev 
and Moscow of an imminent ethnic conflict. To forestall this, they demanded Abkhazia’s 
secession from Georgia.
79
 When this yielded no change, the Abkhaz formally declared 
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that it was a Union Republic in August 1990, essentially calling for secession from 
Tbilisi.
80
 This act was quickly annulled by Georgia, who had the legal prerogative to do 
so. However, its actions resulted in mass demonstrations in Abkhazia that eventually had 
to be put down by Russian troops.
81
 Ethnic tensions rose even further with the election 
and short-lived presidency of Zviad Gamsakhurdia in October 1990.
82
  
In July 1991, the Abkhaz Parliament declared that the nation would revert to its 
1925 constitution, which described Abkhazia as an independent Soviet Republic united 
by a special union treaty with Georgia.
83
 In response, Georgia attempted to reconcile with 
Abkhazia over some of its grievances. However, negotiations broke down by 1992. The 
Abkhaz then proposed a treaty relationship that would have established “confederal 
relations with Tbilisi that would have preserved Georgia’s territorial integrity.” However, 
this proposal was ignored and when the Georgian president was forced into exile in 1992 
and replaced by Eduard Shevardnadze, the subsequent power struggles within Tbilisi 
gave Abkhazia the opportunity to move forward with its plans for independence. 
Abkhazia voted to secede on July 23, 1992 and within three weeks, Georgia responded by 
launching a military offensive.
84
 
Conflict. Georgia crossed into Abkhazia to forcibly restore its territorial integrity 
on August 14, 1992. Initially, the Georgian troops, a mix of government forces and local 
militias, did well. However, by the end of 1992 the Abkhaz had regrouped and rearmed 
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“with the support of volunteers from the North Caucasus and [Russia],” and they forced 
the Georgians back.
85
 
Georgia was not in a potion to engage in a protracted conflict. As such, it had the 
UN broker an initial ceasefire in July 1993.
86
 However, it was broken by an Abkhaz 
offensive in September 1993. They captured the Abkhaz capital of Sukhumi, forced all 
Georgian troops from the region, and expulsed of much of Abkhazia’s ethnic 
Georgians.
87
 In May 1994, Georgia and Abkhazia agreed to a “framework for a political 
settlement and the return of refugees.” Russian troops acting under the auspices of CIS 
were deployed as peacekeepers on the border of Abkhazia and Georgia.
88
 In the end, the 
thirteen-month war killed around ten to fifteen thousand people and resulted in the 
displacement of over 250,000 people, mostly ethnic Georgians.
89
 
The conflict has remained relatively dormant, with a few flare-ups. In May 1998, 
fighting broke out when Georgian partisans attempted to take over part of the Gali 
district, where thousands of displaced Georgians resided. This effort was rebuffed and 
some 40,000 ethnic Georgians were expelled. In late 2001, the conflict seemed primed to 
ignite again, when both Abkhazia and Georgia accused each other of engaging in air 
strikes on each other’s territories.90 Recent salvos have been limited to political and 
diplomatic maneuvering and while both sides remain entrenched, there is little reason to 
expect a outbreak in fighting.   
Russia’s Involvement. Russia has played a significant role in the Abkhazian 
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conflict and reportedly supported both Tbilisi and Sukhumi at different points during the 
fighting. Ultimately, Moscow tipped the scales when it helped Abkhaz fighters push 
Georgian troops out of the region in 1993. Furthermore, its peacekeeping forces continue 
to play a destabilizing force, largely because they do not maintain themselves as an 
impartial force.
91
 The continuing presence of Russian peacekeepers, drawn initially from 
the same troops that Tbilisi claims were involved in the conflict on the Abkhaz side, 
continues to be a point of contention.  
At the time of the conflict, Russia had four military bases within Georgia, 
including one in Abkhazia. While Russia did not incite the Abkhaz conflict, it certainly 
helped exacerbate it. During the war, it was accused of providing Abkhaz fighters with 
“heavy artillery, air cover, and missile launchers.” Tbilisi also contends that Russian 
planes based in the Black Sea engaged in bombing campaigns to support Sukhumi.
92
 
While these claims have yet to be substantiated, and are unlikely to ever be, it is clear that 
Russia’s actions of training fighters and providing materiel to the Abkhaz cause was 
fundamentally important to Georgia’s inability to end the conflict. As Alexander Cooley 
writes in Imperial Wreckage: Property Rights, Sovereignty, and Security in the Post-
Soviet Space, “Without the active involvement of Russian forces stationed in the region, 
the conflict could not have escalated to the point of a decisive Abkhazian victory.”93  
The continuation of this conflict and the unresolved status of Abkhazia’s 
statehood serve Moscow’s interests in a number of ways. Not only does it allow Russia to 
continue to hold a military, political, and economic presence in internationally recognized 
                                                        
91
 McMahon, “Eurasia's Troubled Frontiers,” 56-61. 
92
 Cooley, “Imperial Wreckage: Property Rights, Sovereignty, and Security in the Post-Soviet Space,” 121-
122. 
93
 Ibid., 123. 
  34 
Georgian territory, it also prevents Tbilisi from developing stronger regional and 
international ties, especially with NATO, which does not offer membership to states with 
territorial disputes.  
Implications. This conflict continues to have an outsized impact on regional 
development and security. In its immediate aftermath, economic losses amounted to 
almost $11 billion. Much of Abkhazia’s industry was destroyed or looted and its tourism 
sector was destroyed. Abkhazia has also been under trade sanctions since 1996 and it has 
largely reverted to subsistence farming. The nation is dependent on support from 
international agencies and nongovernment organizations to provide basic social services 
for its citizens.
94
 Another result of the 1996 CIS embargo that “permitted the direct 
import only of food products, medical supplies, petroleum products, and household 
items” was that many Abkhazians have “resorted to trade along undetected or illegally 
sanctioned passageways, including the de facto borders, as well as at its seaports.”95 The 
security threats facing a de facto state also necessitate giving the military and security 
apparatuses undue influence and funding. This comes at the expense of other 
governmental agencies that could conceivably use the nation’s limited resources for more 
robust political, social, and economic development. 
Georgia continues to be affected by this conflict as well. It was burdened with 
over 200,000 displaced persons from Abkhazia at a time when it was still recovering 
from post-Soviet economic stagnation.
96
 Furthermore, Russia continues to have a 
presence within legal Georgia territory and Moscow’s 2008 recognition of Abkhazia’s 
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independence “has contributed to an increase in Russian military, economic and political 
influence in Abkhazia.”97 The rise of smuggling and other criminal activity on Georgia’s 
borders further undermines its security. Lastly, the continuation of this unresolved 
conflict keeps Georgia from becoming more integrated with the West and prevents it 
from achieving NATO membership, one of its most important security goals.   
Attempts at Reconciliation. Though the UN has led negotiations since 1994, 
there has been little progress in resolving the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. Displaced 
persons are unable to return to their homes, skirmishes occur periodically between the 
two forces, and Georgia continues its trade restrictions on Abkhazia.
98
 According to 
Shireen Hunter in “Borders, Conflict, and Security in the Caucasus: The Legacy of the 
Past,“  
The main impediment to peace now is the conflict between the Abkhaz insistence 
on self-determination, and the Georgian insistence on territorial integrity. 
Moreover, Tbilisi is adamant that ethnic Georgian refugees from Abkhazia be 
allowed to return to their homes. Even if compromise could be reached on the 
issue of independence, the Abkhaz are unlikely to accept the return of Georgian 
refugees, because this would once again make them a minority within their own 
country.
99
 
 
Georgia continues to view Abkhazia as an autonomous republic within the Georgian state 
and blames the Russian Federation for interfering and prolonging of the conflict.
100
  To 
Tbilisi, the “integration in February 1931 of Abkhazia in the Socialist Soviet Republic of 
Georgia offers an incontestable argument… [that] Abkhazia is an indivisible part of the 
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Georgian territory.”101 There has been little deviation in this policy over the last twenty 
years. 
Abkhazia continues to develop institutions of statehood in hopes of receiving 
international recognition.
102
 Currently, however, it is only recognized by its fellow post-
Soviet de facto states, South Ossetia, Transnistria, and Nagorno-Karabakh, and, since the 
Russo-Georgian War of 2008, that states of Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru.
103
 
Forecast. Ironically, given Russia’s mistreatment of the Abkhaz minority during 
its imperial and Soviet rule of the area, Abkhazia now depends on Russian protection to 
ensure its de facto sovereignty.
104
 It has, however, attempted to develop a political system 
independent of Moscow. “The Abkhaz arguably also [have] a sharper sense of their own 
history and ethnicity, and [take] their independence seriously, despite their great political 
and economic dependence on Russia.”105 While there is still strong, near universal 
resistance to rejoining Georgia, Abkhazia appears to also be incrementally moving away 
from Russia. In 2006, an opinion poll found that 68% of Abkhazians favored joining the 
Russian Federation while only 25% preferred an independent Abkhazian state. In 2011, 
this drastically reversed with 73% of respondents favoring Abkhazian independence 
while only 25% were in favor of joining Russia. In the same poll, only 0.6%, mostly the 
few remaining ethnic Georgians within the territory, favored rejoining Georgia.
106
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As Abkhazia continues operating as a de facto state, it is becoming more 
confident of its abilities to survive as an independent nation.
107
 Georgia, meanwhile, 
remains dedicated to restoring its territorial sovereignty, though without committed 
outside mediation and reconciliation efforts, this conflict is likely to linger for decades.   
 
South Ossetia  
 Origin. South Ossetia (Figure 2) is the second de facto state within Georgia. 
While the frozen conflict between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali is largely ethnic in nature, it 
differs from Abkhazia in that many Ossetians wish to rejoin with North Ossetia within 
the Russian Federation, preferring annexation to independence.
108
 To the West, this 
conflict appeared to be better managed than the one in Abkhazia in the years after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. However, this abruptly changed with the 2008 Russo-
Georgian War, the largest conflict in Europe since the Kosovo War in 1999.
109
 
Much like other frozen conflicts in this region, the origins of the South Ossetia 
dispute are contested. The Ossetian population consists of two main ethnic groups located 
in what is now North and South Ossetia. The Russian Empire conquered North Ossetia in 
the 18th century and South Ossetia in the early 19
th
 century. After the Russian 
Revolution, North and South Ossetia pushed for the unification of their states. However, 
keeping to its policy of divide and rule, Stalin split the regions in 1922 into the 
Autonomous Region of North Ossetia within Russia and the Autonomous Oblast of South 
Ossetia within Georgia. Both North and South Ossetia petitioned again in 1925 to 
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establish a unified Ossetia. However, they were rejected, though North Ossetia would 
later be upgraded to an Autonomous Republic.
110
 
Under the Soviet Union, South Ossetia experienced no significant interethnic 
issues.
111
 Unlike Abkhazia, South Ossetia retained an ethnic majority throughout this 
time. In 1989, the population was around 100,000 people, 66% were ethnic Ossetians, 
29% were Georgian, and the rest were a mix of Russian, Armenian, and Greek.
112
 
However, similar to Abkhazia, rising nationalism in Tbilisi during the period of glasnost 
in the 1980s frightened many South Ossetians. One of the catalysts for conflict were 
reports that Tbilisi was considering making Georgian Kartuli the official language of the 
country. “This was a most unwelcome prospect for the South-Ossetians, only 14 percent 
of whom could function in the Georgian language.”113 In response, they voted in 1989 to 
upgrade their status to that of an Autonomous Republic, though it kept the territory 
nominally under Georgian authority. Fueled by nationalism, the Georgian Parliament 
rejected the vote and revoked South Ossetia’s autonomous status, precipitating an armed 
conflict.
114
 
Conflict. The resultant war, waged from 1991 to 1992, caused over two thousand 
deaths, significant infrastructure damage to the region, and the displacement of over 
50,000 ethnic Ossetians, who later crossed into North Ossetia. A ceasefire was called in 
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June 1992, brokered by Moscow, and a trilateral peacekeeping force was deployed, again 
led by Russia.
115
 
Tensions rose again in 2003 after Georgia’s Rose Revolution. President Mikhail 
Saakashvili, fresh off a victory against separatists in Georgian Adjara (Figure 2), “made 
the reassertion of Georgian authority over South Ossetia a top priority of his 
administration.” Saakashvili also wanted to reorient Georgia to the West, pitting him 
against Russia.
116
 In 2004, Saakashvili began an offensive to counter smuggling 
operations in South Ossetia. He tightened border controls and sent in hundreds of security 
personnel and, reportedly, guerilla forces into the territory. As a counter, Russia allegedly 
sent in “several hundred paramilitary elements from Abkhazia, Transnistria, and 
Russia.”117 Clashes between both sides ended inconclusively.  
Subsequent peace talks between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali in 2005 led to an offer by 
Georgia for South Ossetia to attain “autonomy equivalent to North Ossetia’s in Russia, 
plus quotas for representation in the national parliament, executive branch, and 
judiciary.” However, as this offer came after what many in South Ossetia perceived to be 
Georgia’s inability to change the status quo militarily, it was summarily rejected and 
South Ossetia voted in November 2006 to reaffirm its independence from Tbilisi.
118
 
The frozen conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia escalated again in August 
2008. This was the third such conflict between them since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Unlike the previous two, Russian armed forces were openly involved. In fact, 
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Moscow played a significant role in escalating tensions prior to the conflict. In March 
2008, the State Duma had outlined two conditions for potentially recognizing Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia’s independence. They were “Georgia’s accession to NATO and use of 
force against the two self-proclaimed republics.” Furthermore, President Putin directed 
financial assistance to both South Ossetia and Abkhazia in order to deepen ties.
119
 Russia 
also engaged in military brinksmanship with Tbilisi, which finally resulted in open 
conflict.  
War broke out in August with a Georgian offensive against Tskhinvali, the 
administrative capital of South Ossetia, and Russian troops dispersed throughout the 
region. Russia responded with a counterattack that drove Georgian troops from South 
Ossetia. Russian forces then launched further air, land, and sea attacks within Georgia 
and emplaced troops in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It followed up with a political 
volley by later recognizing these de facto states’ claims of independence from Georgia.120 
By August 12, Russia had achieved its military and political goals. Then-
President Medvedev declared that “the aim of Russia’s operation for coercing the 
Georgian side to peace had been achieved and it had been decided to conclude the 
operation.... The aggressor [Georgia] has been punished and suffered very heavy 
losses.”121 For its part, Georgia accepted a French-brokered ceasefire that “left Russian 
forces in control of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and ‘security zones’ in undisputed Georgian 
territory.”122 The plan also committed Georgia  
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…not to use force, to halt hostilities, to provide full access for humanitarian aid, 
to withdraw Georgian forces to the places they were usually stationed prior to the 
conflict, to withdraw Russian forces to positions prior to the outbreak of 
hostilities (although they were permitted to implement security measures in the 
zone of the conflict until international monitors were in place), and to open 
international discussions on ensuring security and stability in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia.
123
 
 
By all measurements, this was a successful campaign and ceasefire for the Russian-allied 
Abkhazia that left Georgia with both damaged military and economic infrastructure and 
diminished domestic and international political standing.  
Russia’s Involvement. Similar to Abkhazia, South Ossetia’s continued existence 
as a de facto state is the result of Russia’s desire to maintain a presence in its near abroad. 
In the early 1990s, claims were raised that Moscow was encouraging Ossetian separatists 
as a means to maintain influence over Georgia. While many of these assertions rest on 
circumstantial evidence, Russia cannot claim that it played a passive role in the 1991-
1992 conflict, though some Russian troops undoubtedly acted on their own volition in 
supporting the Ossetian cause. However, Russia was clearly an active participant by the 
end of the conflict and later helped negotiate a ceasefire in 1992 and led peacekeeping 
efforts in the region.
124
  
Moscow’s role in inciting conflict was much more transparent a decade and a half 
later, when Russia made a committed and unambiguous policy towards deterring Georgia 
from forcibly resolving its issues with South Ossetia. “Unlike individual Russian 
servicemen who acted spontaneously in the Georgian-Abkhazian war of 1992-1993, 
Moscow did not merely support the Russian army’s operation. The Kremlin called it ‘an 
operation to compel Georgia toward peace,’ aimed at saving the Ossetian people from a 
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full-scale humanitarian catastrophe.”125 This conflict also had important geopolitical 
implications that undoubtedly influenced Moscow’s decision to intervene.  
The threat of Georgia’s ascension into NATO likely served a fundamental role in 
provoking Russian action in 2008. Russian strategic culture rests on its sense of being a 
besieged state and the threat of a Western-allied state bound by a treaty of 
collective defense with Russia’s current and historic adversaries compelled it to action. 
Putin is also an opportunist by nature and he likely perceived an opportunity for Russia to 
undermine NATO and the United States by inciting Georgia to start a conflict it could not 
win before it was bound by Article Five obligations.
126
 “By roundly defeating a U.S. 
friend, the Russian leadership aimed to undermine Washington’s credibility as a security 
patron of pro-U.S. governments in the CIS.”127 Moscow’s actions were incredibly 
effective. The result of the five-day war was that “the United States seemingly 
demonstrated its unwillingness to put itself in danger to defend a friend, while Russia 
[showed] it had no such problems.”128 Along the Russian periphery, NATO countries 
questioned Washington’s dependability and the efficacy of their security guarantee.  
Coupled with Putin’s goading, American ambiguity over its commitments to 
defend Georgia potentially led Saakashvili to start a conflict he had no way of winning. 
Without active American political and, more importantly, military support, Georgia had 
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no chance in achieving victory, though Saakashvili may have believed his U.S.-trained 
forces could achieve some success against the separatist. Because of this miscalculation 
by Tbilisi, Russia achieved many of its stated and implied goals during the conflict. In a 
2011 speech to Russian soldiers based in Vladikavkaz on the Georgian border, Russian 
President Medvedev said that NATO would have expanded to many post-Soviet 
republics but for the Russo-Georgian War. If Russia “had faltered back in 2008, the 
geopolitical situation would be different now… and a number of countries which 
(NATO) tried to deliberately drag into the alliance would have most likely already been 
part of it now.”129 The conflict provided Russia with a relatively low-cost way to test 
American resolve in defending states with which it does not have formal security 
guarantees. America’s lack of a military response had the effect of increasing Russian 
confidence at home and lowering faith in America internationally.  
Since the conflict, it has been reported that Russian aims were not only to 
consolidate control over Georgia’s breakaway regions but also to depose then-President 
Saakashvili through occupying the capital by directly “killing or arresting Saakashvili, or 
indirectly by triggering his overthrow…Saakashvili’s survival as the popularly elected 
president was a major accomplishment of the diplomacy of the EU and the United States 
that ended Russia’s offensive.”130 Russia may not have accomplished all of its goals but it 
certainly capitalized on what it saw as a vulnerable relationship between Georgia and the 
West. Saakashvili’s miscalculation soured his popularity at home and abroad. His 
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coalition also suffered a number of domestic scandals, which led his party to heavy losses 
in Georgia’s 2012 parliamentary elections.131 
Implications. The intractability of the South Ossetian conflict has deeply 
impacted local, regional, and international actors. South Ossetia is plagued by economic 
weakness, political instability, and criminal elements in its society. The first South 
Ossetia war in the 1990s caused significant damage to industry and infrastructure and the 
displacement of nearly half its population.
132
 The second conflict also resulted in what 
Georgia calls the ethnic cleansing of over 20,000 Georgians from South Ossetia, around 
one-third of the region’s pre-war population.133 It has yet to recover. South Ossetia 
remains to be largely dependent on Russia for both economic and military survival.
134
  
This conflict continues to plague Tbilisi. It is unable to unify its country and must 
invest heavily in its security and military infrastructure at the expense of social, 
economic, and political development. The closed borders between South Ossetia and 
Georgia also has serious economic implications. However, the most important 
consequence of this conflict is that it prevents Tbilisi’s greater integration with the West. 
It joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) program in 1994 and was assured that it 
would eventually become a full-fledged NATO member in the late 2000s. However, the 
Russo-Georgian War in 2008 had many questioning that promise.  
After the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, several allies raised heightened 
concerns that Georgia was not ready to be granted a MAP because of the 
destruction of much of its military infrastructure by Russia, the uncertain status of 
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the breakaway regions, and the uncertain quality of conflict decision-making by 
Georgia’s political and military leadership.135  
 
In the aftermath of the 2008 war, Tbilisi was largely blamed for its outbreak and it 
continues to work to regain trust among its Western security partners.  
The conflict has also affected Russia both positively and negatively. It has 
allowed Moscow to maintain a physical presence on its periphery. However, its needling 
of Tbilisi and incitement of the 2008 war resulted in the withdrawal of Georgia and 
Ukraine from CIS.
136
 As Tbilisi restores its ties with the West, more issues may emerge 
from Russia’s presence in Georgia’s separatist regions.  
Attempts at Reconciliation. The 2008 Russo-Georgian War and Moscow’s 
subsequent recognition of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s independence has set back 
reconciliation efforts between these territories and Tbilisi. Russia is the only state with 
the power to resolve these conflicts. However, it has shown no real desire to do so. The 
international community is impotent to force reconciliation without Moscow’s support 
and dependence on Russian involvement ensures that it can dictate the terms of its role in 
the region. As long as Moscow sees the continuation of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict in 
its best interests, there will be little change on the ground. Likewise, Tbilisi has not 
changed its opinion on the status of South Ossetia and continues to look for ways to 
reconcile the breakaway region with Georgia as a whole. However, it is unlikely that 
Georgia will attempt to force reintegration within the foreseeable future, given the 
disastrous results of the 2008 war. 
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Forecast. South Ossetia is working to develop instruments of statehood in hopes 
of receiving international recognition or Russia’s blessing to reunify with North Ossetia. 
The latter seems unlikely, as Russia made no moves to annex South Ossetia following the 
2008 war. This response was dictated by political expediency and realism, as it would be 
difficult to absorb the deeply impoverished South Ossetia.
137
 Prior to the 2008 war, only 
other post-Soviet de facto states, Abkhazia, Transnistria, and Nagorno-Karabakh, 
recognized South Ossetia. Since the conflict, Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru 
granted recognition to Tskhinvali.
138
 
 
Nagorno-Karabakh 
 Origin. The unresolved conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-
Karabakh (Figure 3) continues to contribute to greater regional instability. While this 
region has been subject to competing claims of ownership for centuries, the situation 
deteriorated and took an especially bloody turn in the early 20
th
 century and again during 
the fall of Soviet Union. A stalemate in Nagorno-Karabakh, characterized as one of “no 
peace, no war,” has persisted for the last twenty years, though the situation is much more 
volatile and dangerous than other frozen conflicts in the region. Frequent outbreaks in 
fighting on the border and increasingly bellicose rhetoric by leaders in Armenia and 
Azerbaijan lead observers to believe that the conflict may escalate quickly.  
Nagorno-Karabakh lies at the crossroads of empires and has been subject to 
conflicts over its sovereignty for centuries. While the area is small, around 1,700 square 
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miles, it was, until recently, home to an ethnically and religiously diverse population. 
Throughout much of history, it was forcefully passed back and forth between the 
Ottoman Empire and Persian Empire. However, in the 19
th
 century, the Russian Empire, a 
rising power in the volatile Caucasus, annexed the area. While Russian control was 
largely uncontested until the 1917 revolution, it was unable to prevent large-scale ethnic 
clashes that engulfed Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1905 and continued intermittently until 
the communists reestablished control of the area in 1921. Tens of thousands of 
Armenians and Azerbaijanis were killed, which entrenched a deep hatred between the 
two groups that was only kept in check as long as the Soviets held absolute control over 
the region.
139
 
 
 
Figure 3. Map of Azerbaijan Showing Nagorno-Karabakh (Source: CIA World Factbook) 
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In 1922, all the states of the Caucasus were incorporated into the Soviet Union, 
forming the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic.
140
 Within a year, the 
territory was organized into the modern states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The 
contested area of Nagorno-Karabakh was designated as an autonomous region and was 
attached to Azerbaijan by Stalin, then the Soviet Nationalities Commissioner. This was 
done largely for economic purposes and in order to keep Azerbaijan from being 
ethnically homogenous.
141
  
Tensions simmered between Baku and its non-Azeri citizens for over 65 years. In 
1987, capitalizing on Moscow’s weakness, Karabakhi citizens began demanding 
unification with Armenia. A year later, supporters of the annexation of Nagorno-
Karabakh rallied in Yerevan and, in the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, a referendum was 
held both without Moscow’s blessing and against Azerbaijan’s wishes.142 Violence broke 
out in both Armenia and Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh was ethnically cleansed of 
Azerbaijanis. There were further atrocities committed by Baku and Yerevan including the 
“massacre of more than 600 Azerbaijani civilians of Khojaly city by Armenian and 
Russian forces in February 1992 and the Azerbaijan central government’s shelling of 
Stepanakert in 1992.”143 These actions mirrored the pogroms that had occurred in the 
region earlier in the 20
th
 century and the conflict quickly escalated, with both sides 
seeking revenge and attempting to assuage historical prejudice and hatred. This 
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unfortunately came as Moscow withdrew from the region, leaving no external force to 
check the passions that had be suppressed, but not diminished, for the better part of a 
century.  
Conflict. Neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan was particularly prepared for the war 
that emerged in 1988. Fueled by almost a century of repressed anger and hatred with no 
outlet, the war turned ugly very quickly. In the end, however, Armenia clearly had the 
advantage. There were strong class distinctions between the two countries that had 
emerged during the Soviet period. Armenians were urbanites and generally more 
educated and wealthy than their rural, unskilled Azerbaijani counterparts.
144
 Furthermore, 
many Armenians served as officers in the Soviet military while “Azerbaijanis were 
prevented from serving in the upper echelons of the Red Army, [and were] restricted to 
non-combat positions such as labor or construction battalions.”145 While Armenia was 
given tacit support by Russia, Moscow actually supplied weapons and materiel to both 
sides, helping to prolong the conflict. Azerbaijan looked to Iran and Turkey, who was 
then fighting a Kurdish insurgency, for limited aid and military training. At the same 
time, Baku experienced a military coup that toppled the president and placed ex-KGB 
chief, Heydar Aliyev, in power.
146
 
 As such, Azerbaijan was ultimately unable to compete militarily with Armenia. 
As a result, a ceasefire was brokered in July 1994 by Russia and Kyrgyzstan and signed 
by representatives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh. All sides promised to 
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work towards finding a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh question.
147
 In the 
end, there were over 20,000 to 30,000 casualties on each side from 1988 to 1994. The 
conflict also resulted in over one million refugees and displaced persons, over three-
fourths of which are Azerbaijani. Somewhere around 15 to 20% of Azerbaijani land, 
including Nagorno-Karabakh and seven other regions, fell into Armenian hands.
148
 The 
territory of Nagorno-Karabakh became a self-declared republic. However, it is currently 
not recognized by any major state, including Armenia.
149
 
Russia’s Involvement. Russia has benefited enormously from the conflict. It has 
effectively played both sides of the issue in order to prolong the fighting indefinitely. 
From these actions, Russia has profited economically, increased its influence in the 
region at the expense of the United States and West, kept Armenia as a tribute state, and 
prevented Azerbaijan from fully emerging as an energy competitor.
150
 
Armenia remains dependent on Russia for trade and other economic support and 
recently joined a Russian-dominated customs union.
151
 Russia is Armenia’s top foreign 
investor and is responsible for a quarter of all trade. Also, Armenia’s safety is guaranteed 
by Russia. It houses somewhere between 3,000 and 5,000 Russian soldiers on its soil at 
any given time and has provided Russia with a lease to the Gyumri military base until 
2044. “Moscow’s military presence in Armenia is the single greatest deterrent to large-
scale military action from Azerbaijan, which cannot and will not fight Russia 
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militarily.”152 Armenia is also a signatory to the CSTO which pledges that it will provide 
and be provided mutual aid if attacked. Other members include Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Recently, the Armenian president, Serzh 
Sargisyan, said, “the strategic partnership between Armenia and Russia is ‘the nucleus of 
Armenian security,’ and that membership in the CSTO… is the ‘real guarantee of 
Armenia’s security.’”153 
However, Azerbaijan also looks to Russia to supply arms and other supplies. In 
August 2013, after a visit from Putin to Baku, it was reported that the two countries 
signed an arms deal worth an estimated $4 billion.
154
 Despite this relationship, Russia and 
Azerbaijan are, in many ways, competitors in the energy market. Russia holds strong 
leverage over the markets that Azerbaijan hopes to supplant and Moscow continues to 
use Nagorno-Karabakh as a tool to prevent Azerbaijan from gaining closer ties to the 
West and from fully developing a robust regional energy infrastructure.
155
 
Recently, Russia made a number of overtures to both Armenia and Azerbaijan 
and offered to mediate a peace deal for Nagorno-Karabakh. Critics argue that President 
Putin is “seeking to cast himself as a peacemaker and to alleviate the damage done to 
Russia’s image by its actions in Ukraine and the downing of the MH17 flight.”156 Outside 
observers question his motives for a number of reasons, including Russia’s 
…continuous contribution to the militarization of the region by supplying both 
conflicting parties with arms; a massive propaganda campaign blaming the West, 
and primarily the U.S., for the increase in tensions; and, as even some Russian 
experts admit, attempts to replace the [Organization for Security and Co-operation 
                                                        
152
 “In the Caucasus, Russia Secures Its Position by Exploiting Regional Tensions,” Stratfor, June 26, 2013. 
153
 Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, 
10. 
154
 Ibid., 11. 
155
 Ibid. 17-18. 
156
 Armen Grigoryan, ”Russia Seeks Increased Control of Karabakh Resolution After Clashes Between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan,” The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, August 14, 2014. 
  52 
in Europe (OSCE)] Minsk Group mediation efforts and to compel Armenia and 
Azerbaijan to accept Russia’s special role in the region.157  
 
Putin hopes to operate outside the existing framework of the Minsk Group and, through 
this, pull both Armenia and Azerbaijan closer under Russia’s sphere of influence. While 
Russia does not want to see an end to the conflict, it hopes to maintain appearances that it 
is doing everything in its power to find a peaceful solution.
158
 
At the same time, Russia cannot allow this region to slip deeper into conflict. If a 
new war broke out, Moscow knows that it would likely be drawn in to play a more active 
role than in the previous conflict. This would be damaging to its prestige as de facto 
hegemon of this region. Furthermore, a conflict has the potential to incite similar 
separatist wars in the North Caucasus within Chechnya, Dagestan, or Ingushetia.
159
 Even 
with these concerns, Moscow “…is not genuinely interested in a resolution of the conflict 
and is able to frustrate the peace accord at any moment.”160 
Implications. Though the war over Nagorno-Karabakh has been under a cease-
fire for twenty years, it is still very much a part of the ethos of Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
The conflict has defined their role in the world since the fall of the Soviet Union and it 
will continue to do so until the conflict is resolved.  
In many ways, Azerbaijan is the pivot of the entire Caucasus region. Georgia 
looks to the West for support while Armenia is still tied to Russia. However, Azerbaijan 
remains doggedly independent and has the potential to be a true leader in the region. 
Despite this opportunity, Baku has muddied its rise to international prestige by dedicating 
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time, money, and effort to demanding retribution for the Nagorno-Karabakh War. 
Azerbaijan sees the conflict as a national humiliation and has pledged to regain its 
territory at any cost. As such, it has spent the last twenty years building up its military 
infrastructure with single-minded focus. Azerbaijan technically has the legal right to the 
territory of Nagorno-Karabakh as the international community and the UN Security 
Council have repeatedly upheld its status as the de jure state.
161
 However, Armenia 
remains in possession of the land and until Azerbaijan forcibly pushes out Yerevan’s 
troops, the situation will remain unsettled.   
 Due to vast oil and gas reserves, Azerbaijan has experienced an economic boom 
and it currently has a GDP many times larger than its neighbors.
162
 With its expendable 
revenue, Azerbaijan has enlarged its arms cache exponentially. From 2003 to 2011, 
Azerbaijan increased military expenses from $135 million to $3 billion and it currently 
spends more on its military than Armenia does on its entire federal budget.
163
 This 
increase in military expenditures has also led to a boost in confidence and bellicosity 
from Azerbaijan’s leadership. In 2010, President Ilham Aliyev said, “Negotiations [over 
Nagorno-Karabakh] will continue whilst we have hope that territorial integrity will be 
restored… If we consider this to be impossible, then the state of Azerbaijan… can at any 
time restore its territorial integrity through military means.”164  
 However, Azerbaijan must face the reality that Russia serves as a guarantor of 
Armenian and, by default, Karabakhi sovereignty. Tensions have only increased in the 
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last decade and “regular military exercises between Armenia and Russia, and on the other 
side between Azerbaijan and military partners such as Turkey and Georgia, have also 
increased feelings of enmity and mistrust between the two sides.”165 In general, however, 
Azerbaijan has eschewed binding military alliances. It does maintain formal relationships 
with Turkey and Israel, however, which includes arms sales.
166
  
 Armenia has followed a different track. International audiences vilified Armenia’s 
policies during the Nagorno-Karabakh War, especially its use of ethnic cleansing, and it 
has lobbied heavily in order to restore its reputation, especially with the United States.
167
 
While it currently leans on Russia for support, it also maintains cleverly managed 
diplomatic relations with opposing countries despite being effectively boxed in by its 
enemies, Azerbaijan and Turkey, on two fronts. However, it suffers from its isolation and 
by not having “direct trade or diplomatic links with two of its neighbors.”168 Armenia’s 
hope is that time will validate its claim and eventually relations with its neighbors will 
normalize.
169
  
 As Armenia and Azerbaijan deal with their shared history and issues in 
idiosyncratic ways, the ceasefire along the 175-kilometer border between the Nagorno-
Karabakh and Azerbaijan remains tenuous. Some estimates indicate that there are over 
20,000 soldiers on each side over the contested border, some within yards of each 
other.
170
 Despite such a heavily militarized perimeter, there are only six international 
monitors that ‘watch’ the area, though they need special permission to even get there. 
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There are dozens of deaths each year of civilians and military personnel from sniper fire, 
mines, etc. and these numbers have risen in recent years.
171
 There were more border 
skirmishes and deaths on the borderlands in 2014 than in any year since 1994. There has 
also been an increase in the use of high-caliber weapons, notably when Azerbaijan shot 
down an Armenian MI-24 combat helicopter that it claimed had entered Azerbaijani 
airspace in November 2014.
172
  
Other countries play a large role in this conflict, perhaps more so than in any other 
frozen conflict on the post-Soviet periphery. Turkey is a significant actor and in many 
ways it serves as a counter to Iranian involvement. Ankara has close military ties with 
Baku but poor relations with Armenia. In fact, the Turkish-Armenia border has been 
closed since 1993 in order to show solidarity with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-
Karabakh War. Turkey and Azerbaijan also share religious and cultural roots. They have 
a significant military cooperation and have engaged in numerous military exercises, 
including a joint exercise in 2012 with Georgia. In 2010, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed a 
ten-year “strategic partnership and mutual assistance agreement [in which] if one of the 
sides is attacked by a third country, the sides will provide reciprocal aid.”173 Turkey is 
also an important customer and transit country for Azerbaijani gas and oil. Though 
Turkey has historically been wary of Russia’s presence in the greater Black Sea region, 
Moscow holds strong leverage over Ankara, including being their main energy provider. 
Turkey may be prevented from coming to Baku’s aid if Russia threatens to cut off power.   
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While Iran aided Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh War, it has historically 
maintained a contentious relationship with Baku. Though their populations are both 
Shiite Muslim, Azerbaijan is a secular country with ties to Israel and the United States. In 
the last decade, there have been a number of incidents with foreign agents from both 
sides infiltrating the other’s country.174 In 2012, “Iran accused Azerbaijan of harboring 
Israeli intelligence agents… That same month, Azerbaijan sentenced seven individuals… 
it claimed had been trained in Iran to carry out terrorism, including plans to bomb the 
Israeli embassy.”175 Iran maintains much better relations with Armenia. Ultimately, Iran 
is not vested in a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and, though it does not 
support Russian intervention in the region, it would try to prevent Western powers and 
Turkey from gaining a stronger foothold in the Caucasus.   
Armenia and Azerbaijan’s immediate neighbor to the north is the Republic of 
Georgia. After the Rose Revolution in 2003, Georgia fixed its sights on the West and 
away from Russia. However, the 2008 Russo-Georgian War showed the West’s 
unwillingness to defend Georgian sovereignty and recent elections brought more pro-
Russian politicians to Tbilisi. This may be dangerous for Azerbaijan as Georgia has been 
helpful in providing Baku with alternative routes for its oil and gas pipelines. Azerbaijan 
is increasingly worried that Russia may use Georgia as leverage against Baku. However, 
Georgia is profiting from the current situation and while it would likely want to see an 
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end to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it may not actively engage in promoting peace 
unless prompted by the United States or other Western powers.
176
 
Attempts at Reconciliation. Even before the ceasefire was in place after the 
Nagorno-Karabakh War, the OSCE formed a committee, later called the Minsk Group, 
consisting of Russia, the United States, France, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, in order to find 
a peaceful resolution to Nagorno-Karabakh. Over the past twenty years, there have been a 
number of meetings and summits. However, no major resolutions have been agreed 
upon.
177
 In February 2010, in response to increased incidents on the border, Turkish 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said, “If Russia, the U.S., and France had worked 
hard within the past 20 years, none of these problems would have emerged.”178 While the 
issue is more complex than that, there is a fundamental lack of urgency about this conflict 
that many see as misguided, especially as tensions have risen over the last two years. 
Forecast. This conflict will not find a peaceful resolution if left to the main 
belligerents. Armenia and Azerbaijan see each other as mortal enemies and local media 
and political leaders have done little to quell nationalist sentiment that vilifies the other 
side. “Both the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides perceive possessing Nagorno-Karabakh 
as a cornerstone of their national identity.”179 However, the international community has 
been unable to resolve the conflict. Russia, the state most suited to mediating a resolution 
has instead prolonged the conflict and derailed any true attempts at peacemaking.  
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It is evident that this conflict has served to limit growth and stability not only in 
the nations and territories involved, but in the greater Black Sea region. It has prevented 
integration with Europe at large and has hurt relationships within its neighborhood. 
Financially, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are suffering from this frozen conflict. 
Azerbaijani oil and gas must take costly routes bypassing Armenia. Consequently, 
Armenia is losing millions on transit fees that are now going to Georgia, Iran, and 
Turkey. Furthermore, this conflict prevents Armenia from trading with two of its 
neighbors and makes it dependent on Russian support and goodwill.
180
  
The current situation is untenable and, if left unchecked, it will ultimately lead to 
war. Analysts note that inflammatory rhetoric is at an all-time high. President Aliyev said 
in August 2014, “The war is not over. Only the first stage of it is.”181 Clashes over the 
summer of 2014 claimed more lives than at any other time since 1994 and Armenia and 
Azerbaijan are engaged in an arms race, one that Armenia is increasingly unable to match 
without the support of Russia. As Moscow increases its presence in Armenia, Azerbaijan 
will feel increasingly trapped and mistrustful of Western allies who they perceive as 
having abandoned the Caucasus and Crimea to Russian machinations.
182
 Azerbaijan is 
increasingly the dominant militarily force in the region and is losing hope for a 
diplomatic solution. If it sees an opportunity, it may not hesitate to strike. Even if Baku 
and Yerevan do not act in a premeditated fashion, the border is heavily militarized and it 
may take only a single accident to spark a conflagration.  
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Transnistria 
Origin. Moldova (Figure 4), a landlocked country that lies between Romania and 
Ukraine, has been in a longstanding conflict with the self-proclaimed separatist region of 
the Republic of Transnistria since it declared independence on September 2, 1990. While 
fighting has largely ceased since a short war in 1992, it remains a potential flashpoint 
between the West and Russia.
183
  
 
 
Figure 4. Map of Moldova Showing Transnistria (Source: CIA World Factbook) 
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Transnistria remains something of an interesting anomaly among the other 
conflicts described in this thesis in that the initial motivation for breaking away from its 
metropolitan state was not driven by ethnic or religious issues, but was guided by elites. 
However, it has metastasized into an ugly, intractable ethnic struggle. While historically 
the Dniester River has divided the Slavic world from the rest of Europe, the conflict 
between the peoples on either side of its bank was not inevitable prior to 1989, which 
makes it different than any other post-Soviet conflict.
184
 
The modern state of Moldova came into existence after the fall of the Soviet 
Union. It was historically a contested region between Russia and Romania. In 1918, 
Moldova, then called Bessarabia, declared its independence from Russia and united with 
Romania. This union lasted until Bessarabia was occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940 as 
a result of the German-Soviet Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which divided much of Eastern 
Europe.
185
 At this time, Transnistria, which had been a territory of the Russian Empire 
from 1792 to 1924 and Ukraine from 1924 to 1940, was joined, unwillingly, with 
Bessarabia. When the territory came under the control of the Romanians from 1941 to 
1944, the Transnistrians viewed this as an occupation, and it was a scarring experience 
that has resonated throughout its recent history.
186
  
Moscow regained control of the region in 1944 and Bessarabia was formally 
annexed in 1947 and renamed the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic.
187
 During this 
time, the Soviets sought to rework the allegiances of the Moldovan people and transform 
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the nation into a cohesive body, though once subsumed into the larger Soviet leviathan. 
“Soviet propaganda promulgated the idea of a ‘Moldovan people’ with a ‘Moldovan’ 
language and culture, distinct from the Romanian one.”188 The creation of a distinct 
Moldovan political identity was not easy. When the Moldovan Union Republic declared 
its independence on August 27, 1991, its last claim to independence had been in the 15th 
century.
189
 
When the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic declared itself independent and 
claimed the name the Republic of Moldova, it was fundamentally different than the other 
newly created post-Soviet states. Moldova is composed of people from various ethnic 
groups with a history that the Soviets had attempted to rewrite and impose upon them. 
Many Moldovans are of either Romanian or Russian descent, the latter the result of 
Russian migration during the Soviet era, and there were no clear indications that the state 
would be able to hold itself together.
190
As such, Soviet occupation was important for 
what would later become the state of Moldova in that it provided a shared experience for 
the Moldovan people. The lack of centuries of common history and identity were less 
important than the shared experience of Romanian occupation and Soviet subjugation.  
Interestingly, Soviet attempts to create a cohesive Moldovan state were not 
applied to Transnistria, a 400 kilometer strip of land on the “left bank” of the River 
Dniester between Moldova and Ukraine.
191
 According to Natalia Cojocaru in 
“Nationalism and Identity in Transnistria,”  
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During the Soviet era the opposition between ‘we, the Transnistrian Moldovans’ 
and ‘they, the Bessarabian Moldovans’ evolved…‘Soviet propaganda had always 
implied that Bessarabians are capitalists, indolent people who speak another 
language. This ideology was well indoctrinated in the psychology of Transnistrian 
people and came to resemble enmity toward the Bessarabian Moldovans.’ The 
difference between Transnistrian and Bessarabian Moldovans was emphasized 
through unofficial policies of the Communist Party. Transnistria was the area 
from which the majority of elites from Soviet Moldova were recruited. The ‘left-
bankers’ were considered more loyal to the Soviet regime and more politically 
reliable than their counterparts from the former ‘bourgeois’ Bessarabia.192 
 
Though nominally the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic consisted of Bessarabia and 
Transnistria, there was a deep divide between these areas. Transnistria had a longer 
history of cooperation with the Soviet Union and did not have the Romanian influence 
that Bessarabia did, other than four traumatic years spent under Romanian rule during 
World War Two. As a result, Transnistria acclimated to Soviet rule much quicker than 
the rest of the SSR. It easily Sovietized, shedding its past and working to create a new 
identity not tied to Romania. Its people wrote books celebrating non-Romanian 
Moldovan culture and history and changed its Latin alphabet to a Cyrillic one.
193
 
According to data from a 1989 referendum, Transnistria had a population of about 
555,000. Some 40% were ethnic Moldovans, 28% were Ukrainian, 24% were Russian, 
and 8% identified with other groups.
194
 While Transnistria also boasts an ethnically 
diverse population, Russian is the official language and Russia seen as its protector and 
savior from Romania. Matthew Rojansky notes in Prospects for Unfreezing Moldova's 
Frozen Conflict in Transnistria that 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that Russian speakers in Transnistria still generally 
think of Romania as the villain and Russia as the hero in a historical narrative 
dating back to World War II, when Bucharest was allied with Nazi Germany. 
Russian speakers therefore associate modern Romanian nationalism with 
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revanchist fascism, a narrative heavily informed by the persistence of a World 
War II memory shaped by Soviet ideologists throughout the Slavic core of the 
post-Soviet space, and in overt conflict with a neo-nationalist historical narrative 
among many of the post-Soviet and post-Communist states in Eastern Europe, 
including Romania.
195
  
 
This divide within the country was not an issue until the late 1980s as Moscow began 
losing power among the SSR. During this time, a movement within Moldova, led by a 
group called the Moldovan Popular Front, publicly challenged Soviet policies and 
attempted to pull Moldova away from the Soviet Union. Initially, they campaigned for a 
return to its original language and Latin script. Transnistrians were worried that this rise 
in Moldovan nationalism would lead the country towards unification with Romania and 
that Transnistria, in turn, would lose its identity and become marginalized.
196
  
While an alphabet may appear to be a minor issue, “the protection and defense of 
a nation’s language is such a deeply emotional nationalist cause, for it is language, more 
than land and history, that provides the essential form of belonging, which is to be 
understood.”197 Chișinău passed a controversial language law in 1989 that “(1) declared 
Moldovan the state language of the republic; (2) mandated the transition to the Latin 
alphabet; (3) recognized the unity of the Moldovan and Romanian languages; and (4) laid 
out a programme for extending its use in government, education, and other related 
spheres…”198 It has been argued that this was the final trigger of the frozen conflict that 
currently engulfs Moldova. 
Moldova’s language law led to increased tensions in the country as Chișinău 
sought closer cultural and political ties with Romania. Worried about what this would 
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mean, the Transnistrians were proactive and, from 1989 to the fall of the USSR, residents 
in Transnistria voted on a number of proposals and referendums seeking to boost local 
autonomy against rising nationalism in the rest of Moldova. This included seeking the 
rights to disengage with Chișinău politically, thereby freeing the region to join with the 
Soviet Union. These plans were stymied when the Soviet Union collapsed. At this time, 
there were many discussions within Moldova about the nation’s identity and orientation 
and Chișinău had to deal with political, economic, and cultural and language issues 
resulting from its newfound independence.  
While the conflict between Moldova and Transnistria is said to be one of elite 
manipulation, it is clear that elites from both sides made fundamental errors.
199
 The 
Moldovans quickly replaced many of the Russian-leaning Transnistrian political leaders 
in the country and threatened economic warfare and the suspension of subsidies to the 
region.
200
 The Moldovan people also made no secret of their desire to shed themselves of 
their Soviet past. In response to these actions by Moldova, independent militias within 
Transnistria sought to consolidate power in its territory. “Every move in Chișinău that 
pulled the republic further away from Moscow was met by a countermove in Transnistria 
that drew the region itself further from Chișinău.”201 As explained by Michael Bobick, 
this laid the groundwork for the conflict to come as Transnistrians increasingly saw the 
move away from  
…Soviet (Russophone) norms as ‘Romanianization’, a phenomenon that 
threatened non-Romanian speakers with persecution, disenfranchisement, and 
death. Violence directed at Russian speakers in Moldovan cities, increasingly 
shrill nationalist rhetoric and armed attempts by the Moldovan state to assert its 
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sovereignty over Transnistria contributed to a heightened sense of threat 
internalized by residents…202 
 
As Chișinău did not assuage these threats, Transnistrians sought to take matters into their 
own hands.  
Conflict. The war between Moldova and Transnistria, when it came, was short 
and decisive, in no small part due to Russian involvement. The fears of political, 
economic, and cultural marginalization mobilized much of the Transnistrian population 
and a little less than a year before Moldova gained its own independence from the USSR, 
Transnistria declared its separation from its de jure state, with the intent to rejoin with 
Moscow.  
In December 1991, after election of the Transnistria Moldovan Republic’s first 
president, Igor Smirnov, paramilitary forces loyal to the new Transnistrian regime 
engaged in a wave of low-scale violence against police stations and other authorities that 
remained loyal to Chișinău.203 This escalated into a larger military conflict in March 
1992. Transnistria was aided by contingents of Russian Cossacks and the Russian 14th 
Army, which had been stationed there since 1956.
204
 This conflict reached its peak at the 
town of Bendery in June when Transnistrian forces and “volunteer” Cossacks and 
Russian Army members routed Moldovan police that had been sent to restore Moldovan 
authority over the town.
205
  
As a result of these decisive victories, a ceasefire was called on July 21, 1992. 
Transnistria, with outside help, had managed to consolidate control over most of its 
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territory. Around 1,500 people were killed in the conflict and the ceasefire, which was 
mediated and enforced by Russia, called for a trilateral peacekeeping operation consisting 
of Russian, Moldovan, and Transnistrian forces along the Dniester River.
206
 As of 2011, 
there were over 1,400 Russian forces, formerly of the 14th Army, based in the area.
207
 
These forces also guard a massive Soviet-era arsenal at Kobasna.
208
 
In Transnistria, the conflict is seen to have solidified its place as a sovereign, 
independent state. Natalia Cojocaru writes that  
In the Transnistrian mass media, the military confrontation of 1992 is presented as 
a ‘sacred war against the genocide by nationalistic Moldovans.’ The armed 
conflict is still viewed as a valid justification for separatism, and in collective 
memory it is ‘a war for truth, justice and independence.’209 
 
This view is as strong now as it was in the early 1990s and such beliefs have made 
reconciliation appear futile.  
Russia’s Involvement. Russia has played the most significant outside role in this 
conflict militarily, economically, and politically and Moscow continues to serve as the 
security guarantor of the Transnistria de facto state. “It is also important to remember that 
the initial Transnistria ambition was not independence, but to remain with the Soviet 
Union; Moscow’s involvement in the dispute was initially to use the separatist movement 
to press the leadership in Chișinău...”210  
From the outset of the conflict in 1990 to its ceasefire in 1992, Russia played an 
important military role and likely played a decisive role in preventing the restoration of 
Chișinău’s central authority over Tiraspol. During the conflict, “the 14th Army’s 
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commanders allowed the transfer of personnel and weapons from their stockpiles to 
robust the separatists’ ranks.” They reportedly “gave the separatists 24 tanks, 12 combat 
helicopters, 37,000 machine and submachine guns, as well as 120 cannons…” The 14th 
Army also went to battle with the Transnistrian forces against Moldova.
211
 
Furthermore, in the ceasefire brokered by Moscow, Russia installed 6,000 
peacekeeping forces within Transnistria.
212
 Russia currently maintains around 1,500 
troops in the region, with less than half serving as peacekeepers. “The idea that Russia is 
a protector of Transnistria and its ethnic minorities has become a pillar to justify the 
continuous presence of the 14th Army in the de facto state” and the continued presence of 
these troops is “a visible symbol of the Republic of Moldova’s ‘limited’ sovereignty.”213 
According to Michael Bobick, the presence of Russian troops in Moldova helps to  
…thwart Moldova’s European aspirations…European efforts to transform the 
peacekeeping mission to an international, civilian mandate have thus far failed. 
Far from being a neutral force, Russia occupies the role of aggressor and 
peacekeeper, which marginalizes Moldovan attempts to re-assert its sovereignty 
over the region.
214
  
 
This helps Russia maintain a foothold in Europe and allow the perception of strategic 
depth. It also serves to physically and psychologically box in Moldova and Ukraine.
215
 
Russian interest in Transnistria also serves an important geopolitical goal. The 
Dniester River historically played an important role as a buffer separating the Slavic 
world from the rest of Russia. Transnistria seems committed to maintaining that legacy. 
“Transdniestrian leaders have publicly stated that they have a historical mission to resist 
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Western expansion and they have promised to continue to defend Russia's geopolitical 
interests in the heart of the Balkans.”216 
Some analysts believe that Moscow’s abiding interest in this territory also comes 
from its economic interests. Transnistria could not survive without economic assistance 
and trading with Russia. In “Reflections on Negotiation and Mediation: The Frozen 
Conflicts and European Security,” William Hill argues that on Russia’s end, its “attitude 
on Transnistria is formed and influenced more by the economic and commercial factors 
involved in the continued existence of an unrecognized, unregulated entity in southeast 
Europe with an economy based heavily on foreign trade.”217  
In all, Russian military and economic support is essential for Transnistria. The de 
facto state would not have survived the last two and a half decades without Moscow’s 
financial and political aid. This includes facilitating travel for Transnistrian citizens. Of a 
population of around 550,000, some 100,000 to 140,000 hold Russian passports, 
including the majority of Transnistrian state officials.
218
 
Implications. Currently Transnistria operates as a de facto state. It has a tripartite 
government; security forces, including an army, police force, and border security; and an 
economy with its own currency and tax system.
219
 However, other than the three de facto 
separatist states in the Caucasus, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, no 
nation recognizes Tiraspol, not even Russia.
220
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While Transnistria has some industrial capacity, including a steel sector, the 
country is largely dependent on aid from Moscow. It struggles with crime and since the 
war “it has been generating economic, social, and human rights problems for the 
inhabitants of both banks of the Nistru…”221 Moldova itself is one of the poorest 
countries in Europe and is severely underdeveloped.
222
 This is even worse in its 
breakaway region. There are few opportunities for honest employment in Transnistria. As 
a result, most of the population is involved in illegal trading activities, which take 
advantage of Transnistria’s geographical location between Ukraine and Romania.223 
“Indeed, due to poorly regulated borders, it is widely believed that Transnistria is a major 
node in European and global arms, drugs, and human trafficking networks.”224 
Transnistrian officials have been accused by many international organizations of turning 
a blind eye to the proliferation of money laundering, smuggling, and weapons trafficking 
within its borders.  
In Alejandro Sanchez’s article, “The ‘Frozen’ Southeast: How the Moldova-
Transnistria Question has Become a European Geo-Security Issue,” he details some of 
Transnistria’s most pressing issues including governance by mafia-like elites, prolific 
human rights violations, smuggling, racketeering, attacks on the press, human trafficking, 
prostitution, and weapons trafficking of everything from missiles, sub-machine guns, and 
nuclear materials that have been traced to conflicts in the Balkans, Caucasus, and Africa. 
It has been reported that many of the weapons being trafficked through Transnistria are 
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currently being produced in factories there as well as being repurposed from old Soviet 
stockpiles.
225
 
Attempts at Reconciliation. Since 1997, the OSCE has led “5+2 format” talks. 
That is, it has managed a conflict resolution process with seven nations, including 
Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, and Ukraine. The United States and EU serve as 
observers. While these talks have worked to quell some crises, they have not resulted in 
any meaningful framework towards conflict resolution.
226
 Transnistria continues to reject 
any calls to rejoin Moldova and oppose the expansion of peace talks.
227
 
As in the case of many of the frozen conflicts discussed in this thesis, it has been 
over twenty-five years since these territories have existed as a cohesive unit. Many 
citizens have no memory of Moldova and Transnistria existing as a single state. This will 
be difficult to overcome.
228
 Moldovans mistrust Transnistrians and view them as 
entrenched Russophiles. They worry that Transnistrians do not share European values 
and would derail attempts by Chișinău to further partner with the West.229 
Transnistrians, having existed in its own de facto state for decades, are largely 
content, even in their poverty, and feel secure with Russia as their guarantor of 
sovereignty. They feel deep mistrust towards Moldova and “being brought up and 
educated in the environment created by the very specific propagandist machine of 
Tiraspol, inhabitants of the left bank gradually developed a belief… that they constitute a 
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‘people’, a separate ‘nation’ endowed with a right to the external self-determination…”230 
It is unlikely that they will ever willingly seek to rejoin Moldova. The question of 
Transnistria joining a greater state usually revolves less around their rejoining with 
Moldova as it does their annexation to Russia. Transnistria consistently calls for 
absorption within the Russian Federation, though Moscow does not appear to be enthused 
by the idea. Transnistria’s “drawbacks are related to its territorial discontinuity with the 
Russian Federation… landlocked position and awkward configuration of its narrow strip 
of land on the left bank of the Dniester River.”231 It also provides few political benefits 
for Russia. Recent calls for annexation by Tiraspol have been exacerbated since the 
Crimea conflict annexation and it often cites an internationally unrecognized referendum 
held on the issue in 2006 where Transnistrians voted overwhelmingly to rejoin Russia. 
Some 97% voted in favor of future integration into Russia.
232
 
While Russia has not leapt at this offer, it is clear that they would have powerful 
leverage if they wanted to resolve this frozen conflict, especially as the international 
community has placed little effort in finding a solution to this issue. “Lacking 
international recognition [Transnistria and other de facto states will continue]… as 
havens for smuggling, corruption and trafficking in everything from drugs to people.”233 
Though this conflict is frozen, like others in the region it has the potential to spiral 
quickly, though it would take a major incident resulting from these conflicts to actually 
galvanize the international community to push Chișinău and Tiraspol towards 
reconciliation.  
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Forecast. There are few signs that this conflict will be resolved with any 
expediency. At the same time, it is unlikely that fighting will break out again. “Chișinău 
understands, particularly due to the 2008 summer war in Georgia, that Moscow will 
actively support Transnistria, as it did in 1992, and little aid can be expected from 
NATO.” 234 Though Moscow is increasing its presence in the Transnistria and conducts 
military exercises regularly, there is little sense of urgency within the region.
235
 
While the Transnistrian economy is stunted and they remain dependent on 
Russian economic support for its survival, Moldova is doing almost as poorly. From 
Tiraspol’s perspective, there seem to be few compelling reasons to consider rejoining 
Moldova. In referendums, Transnistria has consistently voted to maintain its 
independence from Moldova, while indicating its desire to join Russia. While Moscow 
does not want Transnistria to rejoin with Moldova, it has not indicated that it would like 
for the region to join the Russian Federation.
236
 However, with recent events in Crimea, 
threats of annexation may carry more weight than at any time in the previous decades.  
 
Crimea  
Origin. On its surface, the frozen conflict in Crimea bears many similarities to 
others in the post-Soviet space. Each emerged after a shared history of centuries of 
Ottoman rule followed by over two centuries under Russian imperial and communist 
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control, resulting in serious internal ethnic and cultural issues.
237
 In Crimea, the problems 
preceding the 2014 conflict had been festering for some time. However, the situation as a 
whole does not fit neatly into the paradigm of the other frozen conflicts discussed in this 
thesis. Furthermore, Russian involvement in this secessionist movement was a clear 
deviation from its involvement in previous conflicts and the result, an annexation of 
sovereign Ukrainian territory to Russia, may represent a new model for Russian policy in 
its near abroad.  
Crimea (Figure 5), a territory of some 26,200 square kilometers, has existed as an 
independent state for less than four decades of its history. It has otherwise been ruled by a 
series of hegemons, including: “…the Greeks, Bulgars, Scythians, Romans, Gots, Huns, 
Khazars, Kievan Rus, the Byzantine Empire, Venice, Genoa, Kipchaks, the Mongol 
Golden Horde, Ottoman Empire, Russian Empire, Soviet Russia, Soviet Union, Germany, 
Soviet Union again and Ukraine...”238 It became a colony of the Russian Empire in 1787 
after Russia wrested the territory from the Ottoman Empire in a series of conflicts. At the 
time, the peninsula was called the Taurida Governorate. In the centuries since, Crimea 
has undergone a dramatic demographic, cultural, economic, and political transformation. 
The territory was once home to a large population of Muslim Tatars and Turks who were 
forcibly removed from the region or killed after the Russian Empire took over. What 
followed in the 19
th
 century was a policy of forced Russification of the remaining 
population through compulsory schooling, military service, and conversion to Orthodox 
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Christianity. There was also a massive resettlement of ethnic Russians to the area starting 
in 1783, which displaced many of the indigenous inhabitants.
239
  
 
 
Figure 5. Map of Ukraine Showing the Crimean Peninsula (Source: CIA World 
Factbook) 
 
After the collapse of the Russian Empire and the rise of the Soviet Union, Crimea 
underwent further changes. In 1917, the Taurida Governorate was split, with much of the 
peninsula, less the port city of Sevastopol, which hosted the main naval base of the 
Russian Republic’s Black Sea Fleet, forming the Crimean People’s Republic. The rest of 
the governorate joined the Ukrainian People’s Republic. In October 1921, after the Soviet 
Union regained much of its control over former holdings, Crimea was given the name the 
Crimean ASSR and it became a subunit of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic. Crimea was incorporated into the Soviet Union only a year later and remained 
as part of the USSR with the exception of three years of occupation by the Third Reich 
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from 1941 to 1944. After World War Two, Crimea was stripped of its autonomous status 
and became a simple oblast or state of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic.
240
  
This lasted until 1954 when control of the Crimean Oblast was transferred to the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a symbolic gesture marking the 300
th
 anniversary 
of “Russo-Ukrainian reunification.”241 Sevastopol continued to be directly administered 
by Moscow as it controlled the fate of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet.
242
 Propaganda aside, 
this transfer was likely completed in order to provide a large labor force to Ukraine. 
However, it clearly violated Articles 14 and 18 of the Soviet constitution, which required 
consent between Soviet Socialist Republics before any changes were made to their 
borders. “Therefore, even in Soviet terms the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine was illegal, 
unconstitutional and clearly illegitimate.” 243 
Crimea was subject to further upheaval during the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. During this time, Ukraine voted to maintain Crimea as an autonomous republic 
within Ukraine. However, this was done without the consent of the people of Crimea, 
many of who wanted to rejoin with Russia. In reaction, in February 1992, the Crimean 
ASSR changed its name to the Republic of Crimea without Ukraine’s consent and in May 
1992, the Crimean parliament declared the state’s independence and passed its first 
constitution. It was later amended at Kiev’s insistence to specify that Crimea was part of 
Ukraine and very quickly afterwards Crimean independence was voted null and void by 
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the Ukrainian parliament.
244
 
The issue over Crimea’s ownership was, and remains, a surprisingly sensitive one 
for Russians within the new Russian Federation.  
Indeed, the Crimea was the only territory outside of the perimeter of the new 
borders of the Russian Federation about which most Russians, irrespective of their 
political orientation, felt strongly….[However,] in 1991, Yeltsin chose not to 
insist on the restoration of the peninsula to Russia, in exchange for Ukraine’s 
renunciation of its portion of the Soviet nuclear arsenal deployed on its 
territory.
245
  
 
This was a strategic decision by Moscow, emotions notwithstanding. At face value, 
Ukraine could potentially become a threat. As the Soviet empire faced collapse in 
Moscow, Kiev appeared poised for resurgence, despite institutional and economic issues.  
Ukraine [was] the largest new state to be created in Europe [in the 20
th
 century]; 
52 million people in a territory the size of France, a nation with an army of 
600,000 men; the legatee of an imperial arsenal that [made] it the third nuclear 
power in the world; the sixth largest naval power by virtue of its claim to part of 
the Black Sea fleet moored in Sevastopol; a nation of enormous natural wealth 
ranging from the coal and steel of the Donetsk basin to the agricultural abundance 
of the black-soil lands.
246
  
 
At the time, it seemed prudent for Moscow to relinquish Crimea to Ukraine instead of 
raising tensions with its former satellite.  
Russia again agreed to uphold Ukraine and Crimea’s post-Soviet borders when it 
signed a treaty with Ukraine in 1997 recognizing the boundaries that existed at the time 
of the breakup of the Soviet Union, thereby legally conferring and confirming Crimea’s 
status as belonging within Ukraine.
247
 However, this still did not solve the problems 
between Moscow and Kiev over the peninsula. Some of the many issues between these 
states specifically dealing with Crimea included “the division of the Soviet Black Sea 
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Fleet between the two states, the basing rights of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in 
Sevastopol, the Russian use of military facilities in Crimea, [and] the number and status 
of Russian military personnel in Ukrainian territory.”248 Furthermore, Kiev alleged that 
since 1991 Moscow had “covertly supported and controlled the actions of Russian 
separatists in Crimea and also maintained a sizeable contingent of its own civilian (FSB) 
and military intelligence (GRU) agents.”249  
 For its part, the newly sovereign Ukraine faced many domestic problems in the 
early 1990s. At the fall of the USSR, Ukraine appeared to have the requisite requirements 
for successful statehood. However, it had been a part of Russia for centuries and had not 
existed as an independent entity since the 15
th
 and 18
th
 centuries. Kiev needed to find a 
way to hold its state together. Momentum was on its side initially as rising nationalism 
that had emerged as a result of Soviet policies of glasnost and perestroika helped make 
the case that “there always was a Ukrainian nation; that it had been suppressed for 
centuries; that it has at last found its freedom...” However, Moscow “was not wrong 
when it dismissed nationalist feeling here as weak, marginal, and easily suppressed.”250 
There was no consensus in Ukraine on how to proceed and define its new state. 
Furthermore, conflicting demographic elements would make achieving consent difficult.  
In the Russified east, Soviet rule was popularly supported, whereas in the West, 
the Soviets were seen as occupiers. As noted by Anton Bebler, during the late 1980s,  
Western Ukraine was convulsed with student demonstrations, strikes, and 
religious processions. The mistake that cost Gorbachev his empire was to believe 
a new Soviet man had been created here. He was to discover how bitter, enduring, 
and unforgiving national memory can be… As in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and 
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Hungary, nationalism and national revival here mean returning to Europe… Being 
a European here means not being Russian.
251
 
 
Such fundamental differences in perspective between east and west Ukraine were 
significant and did not lessen over the next decade. In the east, and especially in Crimea, 
demographics are not in Kiev’s favor. The 2001 Ukrainian census found that Crimea’s 
population consisted of 58% ethnic Russians, 24% Ukrainians, and 12% Crimean Tatars. 
Much of the ethnic Russian population was resistant to assimilation with the larger 
Ukrainian state. Over the last twenty-five years, and especially since 2014, there has been 
an increase in the number of Russians moving to the peninsula and an exodus of ethnic 
Ukrainians and Tatars from Crimea.
252
  
The pro-democratic Orange Revolution in 2004 and 2005 further worsened ties 
between Ukraine and Moscow. Russia was afraid that this revolution would herald 
Ukraine’s eventual membership into NATO, a red line for Moscow. It believed that 
Ukraine lay within its historical sphere of influence and that the West’s incursion into this 
space presented an existential threat. “Since the mid-1990s, Russians have come to accept 
Ukraine as a separate state, but they still did not exactly consider it a foreign one. In the 
elite and to some extent also popular mind, Kiev remained ‘the mother of Russian cities.’ 
NATO accession would turn this part of Russian national patrimony into a Western 
bulwark against Russia.”253 Moscow believed Ukraine would turn against Russia, 
creating a divide between the countries on everything from religion to trade. Furthermore, 
Moscow worried that it would have to deploy troops to its border, cut defense industrial 
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links with Kiev, and move its fleet in the Black Sea to make room for the U.S. Navy.
254
 
Based on recent events, it seems likely that “Russian contingency plans for the 
annexation of Crimea were probably prepared and regularly updated for at least two 
decades.”255 Furthermore, the decision to annex Crimea, as will be described in the next 
section, was likely decided as far back as 2008 when the NATO summit in Bucharest 
opened the possibility of Ukrainian and Georgian membership. However, immediate 
invasion plans were postponed temporarily after the pro-Russian politician Victor 
Yanukovich became the President of Ukraine.
256
 
Conflict. The military, economic, and political issues between Ukraine and both 
Crimea and Russia smoldered for over two and a half decades. The ethnic-Russian 
Crimean population had been restive since the early 1990s and resisted assimilation with 
Ukraine. Furthermore, Russia maintained a military presence within Sevastopol and  
…the presence of Russian Armed Forces on the territory of a legally independent 
successor state offered not only psychological comfort but also, when needed or 
feared, physical protection for separatists [in Crimea]. This protection allowed 
them to carry out illegal referenda [in 2014], to proclaim and subsequently defend 
the secession.
257
 
 
In February 2014, a series of protests broke out in Ukraine against the ruling 
regime in what would be called the Euromaidan Revolution. On February 22, 2014, 
following the deaths of dozens of protesters, President Yanukovych was overthrown and 
he, along with a group of high-level Ukrainian officials with close ties to Moscow, fled to 
Russia. During the power vacuum before the interim government could restore order, 
Moscow carried out its operation to annex Crimea. The speed, success, and covert nature 
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of this operation clearly indicate that these plans had been set for some time.
258
 
On February 26, 2014, clashes orchestrated by Moscow pitted pro-Russian and 
pro-Ukrainians protesters against each other near parliament in Crimea’s capital 
Simferopol. The pro-Russian protesters blockaded the parliament building, which was 
later occupied by pro-Russian gunmen, and demanded secession from Ukraine. They also 
pleaded for intervention from Moscow. The next day, armed and masked individuals, 
ostensibly agents from Moscow, seized and barred entrance to government buildings 
throughout Crimea. During an emergency session of the Supreme Council of Crimea, 
which was held under armed guard, Sergey Aksyonov of the Party of Russian Unity, an 
ethnic Russian from Moldova, was appointed the new Prime Minister of Crimea. The 
council also voted to terminate the Crimean government and hold a referendum on the 
status of the peninsula.
259
 
By February 28, 2014, deputies of the Russian State Duma submitted an 
amendment to the constitution on admitting new territories to the Russian Federation. 
“The draft specifically justified the incorporation of parts of Ukraine into the Russian 
Federation on the grounds of alleged Ukrainian discrimination against national 
minorities.”260 That same day, in Crimea, “local self-defense” militias, assisted by “little 
green men” who later turned out to be Russian forces,  
…seized the strategically important Perekop Istmus, blocked or cut off all land, 
sea and air connections of Crimea with the rest of Ukraine, took over all Crimean 
ports and airports, radio and TV stations, blocked and occupied all installations of 
the Ukrainian Army and Navy, and illegally expropriated practically all their 
stocks of arms and ammunition.
261
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Their actions “diminished Ukraine’s ability to exert control and maintain order. Existing 
Russian military and naval installations in Crimea led to confusion as to whether these 
‘little green men’ were legally allowed to be there according to the terms of a 2010 
basing agreement.”262 
The conflict was a testament to the Russian ability to conduct hybrid warfare, the 
combining of traditional means of military power with other types of non-military power. 
Russia commanded fewer than 10,000 assault troops and an unknown number of masked 
“little green men.” The latter are a mix “of regular infantry and anti-terrorist police units 
with a secret chain of command…bearing no insignia or visible ranks on their combat 
fatigues.”263 Their loyalty is intended to be ambiguous and, during the early hours and 
days of conflict, conceal the state identity of the invading force to prevent easy 
attribution. 
The success of Russia’s three-week operation was due to three main factors, as 
enumerated by Anton Bebler in “The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict over Crimea.” Russia 
was able to draw on its marines that were legally stationed in Sevastopol and who could 
be used for reconnaissance and other missions prior to the conflict without raising 
suspicion. Furthermore, all of Crimea’s important strategic assets were located in close 
proximity, especially its main airport. This allowed for the “quick insertion of air-
transported troops and speedy acquisition of targets.”264 Last, according to Bebler, 
Ukraine’s military, for lack of information, training, or loyalty, did not effectively defend 
Crimea. Anton Bebler writes that  
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…the Ukrainian military personnel stationed in Crimea were not given orders to 
resist and thus all 190 military installations and most weapons were surrendered 
to the invaders. About 20,000 Ukrainian military personnel capitulated without a 
shot being fired. Moreover, most of them switched their loyalty and opted to 
remain in Crimea. Most of the Ukrainian Navy was also captured by the Russian 
military without resistance. The Ukrainian commanding officers did not try to sail 
off with their ships and crews in order to reach mainland Ukrainian ports. Only 
several serviceable aircraft of the Ukrainian Navy escaped the capture. The 
Crimean police either failed to act or cooperated with the Russian Special Forces 
and Crimean separatists.
265
 
 
However, “although the Russian Armed Forces de facto occupied Crimea, they did not 
establish a military occupation regime.”266 It seems likely that at the time Moscow was 
still deciding whether to annex the territory completely or to allow it to perpetuate as a de 
facto state.  
Russia’s Involvement. The extent of Russia’s support to separatists in Crimea 
and its annexation of the peninsula signifies a dramatic departure from how it previously 
dealt with secessionist movements in its periphery. However, there were many who 
predicted such action. In 1993, Michael Ignatieff, in his book Blood and Belonging: 
Journeys into the New Nationalism, presciently wrote:  
The Crimea is the most contested ground in Ukraine. If Russians are ever likely to 
fight Ukrainians, it might be here. Ethnic Russians outnumber Ukrainians in the 
peninsula; all are stridently aware that the Crimea was ceded by Stalin’s 
successors to Ukraine only in 1954. There are Russian separatists here… who 
want to break away from Ukraine and seek to restore the Crimea’s status as an 
autonomous republic, which it enjoyed before the Second World War.
267
  
 
Since the fall of the USSR, Russia had opposed Ukraine’s greater integration with the 
West and its aspirations for NATO membership. After the Crimea conflict, Russia made 
it clear that its motivations were purely geopolitical. NATO’s spread “‘directly in front of 
the Russian house,’ ‘on Russia’s historic territories’ remains to President Putin and to the 
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Russian elite utterly unacceptable.”268 Ukraine has been a vital territory to Moscow and 
“Crimea is psychologically much closer to the hearts of many Russians and particularly 
of the Russian military than any of the four other ex-Soviet territories.”269 
In 2006, Russia made clear its interests in regards to Crimea. Putin said that “The 
Crimea forms part of the Ukrainian side and we cannot interfere in another country’s 
internal affairs. At the same time, however, Russia cannot be indifferent to what happens 
in the Ukraine and Crimea.”270 The Russian pretexts for its dramatic intervention in this 
conflict are similar to its claims in other frozen conflicts on its periphery. Michael Bobick 
argues that the Crimea example followed the same template as almost every other post-
Soviet intervention in which  
…a sudden power shift to a ‘nationalist’ government alienated those who see 
themselves as ethnically or linguistically outside of the nation. This perceived 
threat, coupled with Russian military backing, creates the conditions for the 
emergence of a hitherto non-existing nation. Next, constituent holders of 
sovereignty are called forth through the most democratic of all processes, the 
referendum. Finally, Russia stabilizes the situation with a one-sided peace 
agreement (Transnistria), annexation (Crimea), or international recognition 
(Abkhazia and South Ossetia).
271
 
 
Russian involvement in this conflict serves a number of purposes. First, it helps 
protect its military assets in Crimea. Second, it halts in its tracks any NATO expansion 
that includes Ukraine. It also shows Russian groups abroad that Moscow can be depended 
upon. This is sharply juxtaposed with the West’s failure to answer Georgia’s call for aid 
in the 2008 war and Ukraine’s plea for help in 2014. Russia’s involvement also renews 
hope among other Russian secessionist movements and among de facto states in the 
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greater Black Sea region. Furthermore, it reinvigorates Russia’s place as the power 
broker in the region and reasserts its hegemony along its periphery and self-claimed 
sphere of influence. Any resolution to this or the other frozen conflicts in the region will 
need to go through Russia. Finally, it puts the rest of Eastern Europe and the United 
States on notice. This conflict was a highly planned covert operation that was executed 
near-flawlessly. It provides a tacit threat to other states along Russia’s northwestern 
border, especially Poland and the Baltic states, and shows Russia’s willingness to use 
kinetic force to achieve its goals. And, for the first time in decades, Moscow’s goals may 
include the forcible redrawing of international borders.  
Implications. The Crimea situation is unique in post-Cold War Europe. It has 
stoked concerns over a revanchist, neo-imperialist Russia. While Moscow’s actions can 
be understood as preemptive, in order to forestall NATO expansion on its borders, it can 
also be seen as a “renunciation of the balance of power in the Euro-Atlantic area formed 
after the end of the Cold War and as a demand for a redefinition of legitimate ‘zones of 
interest’ in Europe. It could be also taken as a stern warning to other ex-Soviet republics 
to behave.”272 
In order to legitimize the Crimean annexation, a ‘people’ needed to be created that 
could then call for sovereignty and the right to self-determination. This narrative was 
important to justify annexation. “An occupation had to be staged on humanitarian 
grounds – who or what these forces were protecting and from what remained unclear – 
and self-determination occurred under the watchful eye of masked men with guns…”273 
However, a referendum was called for on March 16, 2014. Importantly, there was no time 
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allowed before the referendum for debate over the issues facing Crimean citizens. After 
February 28
th
, 2014, Russian security personnel had blocked off land and air access to 
Ukraine and had taken over or shut down all television and printed media. During this 
time, Crimea was subject to persistent disinformation. “The intense propaganda 
campaign, almost like that seen during the Cold War, depicted the interim Ukrainian 
authorities in Kiev as ‘fascists’ or ‘neo-Nazis’ who had presumably threatened the 
Russian and Russian-speaking population with ‘genocide.’”274 Furthermore, the 
referendum did not include the options to stay as part of Ukraine or to declare Crimea’s 
independent statehood.  
Reportedly, over 81% of the population voted. Of these, 97% voted to separate 
from Ukraine and integrate with Russia.
275
 Ukraine and some ethnic groups within 
Crimea, including the Crimean Tatars, reject these results. However, even though it is 
likely that the results of the referendum were inflated to legitimize Crimea’s annexation 
into the Russian Federation, much of the Russian-speaking minority in Crimea 
overwhelmingly supported it.
276
 
On March 21
st
, 2014, the “Constitutional Law on admitting to the Russian 
Federation the Republic of Crimea and Establishing within the Russian Federation the 
New Constituent Entities the Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Importance 
Sevastopol” was passed in the Russian Federal Assembly and signed by President Putin. 
Crimea and Sevastopol were officially accepted as new units of the Russian 
Federation.
277
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The resolution of the initial stages of this conflict and integration of Crimea into 
the Russian Federation was seen as a paradigm-shifting event. Russia has had few qualms 
in supporting separatist movements on its periphery. Indeed, “it has become clear that 
while Russia will deal with any secession within its borders in the harshest manner (i.e. 
Chechnya), it has no problem supporting secessionist movements abroad… if these 
groups are pro-Moscow.”278 However, it had never taken the steps to integrate these de 
facto states into the Russian Federation before, despite Transnistria repeatedly asking and 
voting for the privilege of doing so. Other separatists in the region as well as the 
international community believed that this represents a change in how Moscow deals 
with the nations and conflicts on its periphery. However, though this success seems to 
have given Moscow a confidence-boost and allowed it to be more active in the region and 
world, notably Syria, there have not been other moves to resolve conflicts on its 
periphery or further integrate any more territory with the Russian Federation.  
 Since 2014, nations and de facto states have interpreted Moscow’s actions in 
different ways. Tbilisi had been a strong ally to Ukraine since the fall of the Soviet Union 
and Georgia perceives the Ukrainian crisis “as a microcosm of the bigger geopolitical 
standoff between Russia and the West, rather than as a sui generis crisis that arose out of 
various domestic political developments.”279 It is worried that Georgian territory will be 
next on Moscow’s agenda and it has renewed its drives to become more integrated with 
the EU and NATO. However, though South Ossetia and Abkhazia seek stronger ties with 
Moscow, it is unlikely that they would be absorbed into the greater Russian Federation, 
according to Sergey Markedonov and Maxim A. Suchkov. 
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Though the worry that Moscow will incorporate the breakaway regions into its 
territory is certainly not farfetched, it is based on the assumption that it is now the 
Kremlin’s strategy to multiply ‘Crimean precedents’ all across the post-Soviet 
space. The reality, however, is that Moscow has shown little appetite to extend the 
precedent to the Caucasus…280 
 
Though it has signed new treaties with these territories, Moscow repeatedly rebuffs calls 
to change the status of these regions’ borders and incorporate them into the federation.  
Azerbaijan has been wary since the Crimean conflict, fearing intervention in 
Nagorno-Karabakh on Armenia’s behalf. Yerevan looked upon Moscow’s actions in 
Crimea favorably and it has pushed closer to Russia since the annexation in hopes that 
Moscow will provide further support to its claims in Nagorno-Karabakh. “There is 
growing sentiment across the political spectrum that the ‘re-incorporation of Crimea into 
Russia’ justifies Yerevan’s striving to win back ‘Armenia’s historical lands’ in Nagorno-
Karabakh.”281 As such, since the spring of 2014, that conflict has heated up. The 
summers of 2014, 2015, and 2016 saw the most ceasefire violations since the conflict 
reached an armistice in 1994.  
However, in The Caucasus after Ukraine, Sergey Markedonov and Maxim A. 
Suchkov claim that there is little to be gained from further annexations, calling into 
question the idea that Crimea represents a major policy shift for Moscow in regards to 
separatist movements.   
The truth of the matter is that Russia has little additional leverage to gain from 
outright annexation, and in fact would be only multiplying its liabilities, both 
economic and in the security realm, should these wayward territories be joined to 
it. And therein lies a potentially serious trap for Moscow. If the Russian-backed 
regions present the Kremlin with a direct plea for annexation, it will face an 
unpleasant choice: either disappoint its clients or further antagonize the West, 
cementing its reputation as a pariah state for more than a generation to come… 
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Nevertheless, none of this means that Russia will foreswear annexation 
eventually…282 
 
At this time, Moscow does not seem likely to apply the Crimea precedent to other 
conflicts. However, it does show that Moscow takes its role as hegemon and protector of 
foreign-born ethnic Russians seriously and it may not hesitate to act militarily if another 
such situation arises.  
Attempts at Reconciliation. The Crimean conflict is ongoing, though little has 
been done to reverse Russian gains. There are also issues with other separatist regions 
within Ukraine, including Donbass. The diplomatic situation there seems dire. On 
September 1, 2014, the OSCE arranged for a ceasefire. The resultant Minsk Protocol was 
signed by Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR), and the 
Lugansk People's Republic (LPR) and a follow-up was agreed to on September 19, 2014, 
which banned offensive operations, halted flights by combat aircraft over the region, and 
arranged for OSCE mediation. It was never effectively put into place and completely 
collapsed by January 2015. Another attempt at a ceasefire, Minsk II, was signed in 
February 2015 but it has also been largely ineffective.
283
 
Moscow cancelled a meeting during the G20 Summit in September 2016 to 
discuss the Minsk ceasefire. Since then, there has been a steady increase in violence 
between separatist and Ukrainian forces. Russia has taken the opportunity to blame Kiev 
for its inability to maintain a lasting ceasefire and is using this crisis to deepen the divide 
between Ukraine and the West. In August 2016, Putin accused Ukraine of plotting 
terrorist attacks and said, “I think it is clear now that today’s Kiev government is not 
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looking for ways to solve problems by negotiations, but is resorting to terror.”284 Michael 
Kofman writes that while  
…the separatists have not abided by the terms of the ceasefire, Europeans have 
been pushing Ukraine to fulfill its side of the bargain for over a year now without 
much success. Russia is banking on the fact that U.S. and European leaders have 
no alternative plan for freezing this conflict, and will further lean on Kyiv to start 
giving Moscow what it wants rather than see the Minsk framework publicly 
unravel.
285
 
 
As this plays out, Kiev is losing support internationally as many of the powers that could 
make an impact, namely the United States, are more focused on conflicts elsewhere and 
do not wish to actively confront Russia.  
Forecast. Since 2014, the political and legal impasse between Ukraine and Russia 
over the status of Crimea has created a new frozen conflict in the greater Black Sea 
region. While the self-proclaimed Republic of Crimea adopted a new constitution in 
April 2014 and a formal annexation was approved by Russia in March 2014, the 
international community still recognizes Crimea as belonging to Ukraine. The Ukrainian 
parliament has repeatedly reaffirmed that Crimea is its territory. However, there seems to 
be little that it can do to enforce its claim. Ukraine has closed its borders with Crimea and 
cut off all rail and road connections. Russian Prime Minister Medvedev declared that the 
present status of Crimea was a non-negotiable “closed chapter.” This conflict is likely not 
over but it raises the specter and fear of a more militarily adventurous and less cautious 
Russia both in Ukraine and elsewhere in the region.
286
  
President Putin’s actions in Ukraine have upended the post-Cold War European 
order. In the 25 years since the dissolution of the USSR, Europe sought deeper political 
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and economic ties, as evidenced by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which created the 
European Union and a single European currency, the euro. The post-war European 
paradigm also included the belief that borders would be maintained, with few notable 
exceptions, even as borders themselves seemed to lose relevance among the many nations 
in Europe who are part of the Schengen Agreement. However, the idealism, and perhaps 
naiveté, of post-Cold War Western leaders has been checked, and Russian actions along 
its periphery have increased tensions with its neighbors and the United States. While 
more actions to forcibly rewrite borders, as Russia has done with Crimea, do not seem 
imminent, they are no longer outside the realm of possibility. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Stasis 
The conflicts over Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, and 
Crimea have reached points of uneasy equilibrium. “Unrecognized by the international 
community, prey to organized crime, mired in economic misery, scoured by ethnic 
cleansing, and seared by recent memories of war, these hard-pressed territories have 
clung to their independence, ever fearful that the states from which they seceded will 
reabsorb them.”287 While the metropolitan states of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and 
Ukraine are too weak politically, economically, and militarily to retake their breakaway 
states, they have not given up hopes of doing so. The underlying issues of these conflicts 
have not been resolved and without oversight by the international community, they are 
likely to become a strategic liability for states both within and outside the region.   
The conflicts discussed in this thesis have many similarities. Each de facto state 
shares a history of centuries of Ottoman rule followed by over two centuries under 
Russian imperial and communist rule, resulting in profound ethnic and cultural 
problems.
288
 During much of the Soviet era, these territories, composed of ethnic 
minorities distinct from their metropolitan states, were neither allowed freedom of 
cultural and ethnic expression, nor were they forced to assimilate with the culture of the 
state to which they were attached. At the same time, they were allowed regional and 
ethnic administrative systems that supported the growth and development of nationalist 
secessionist movements that rose to prominence in the 1980s during the waning years of 
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the Soviet Union.  
Except for the most recent conflicts in South Ossetia and Crimea, all the other 
frozen conflicts in this thesis have been held by ceasefires since the early 1990s that 
“enshrine[d] the victory of separatist forces on the battlefield…”289 Most de facto states 
are host to Russian peacekeeping forces and despite being monitored by international 
organizations, little progress has been made in over two decades of negotiations. 
“Separatist entities have used [this time] to pursue state-building projects, reflected in the 
creation of an array of institutions and the development of a discourse of statehood and 
sovereignty among their elites and populations.”290 
They have also tried to find different justifications to appeal to states for greater 
international recognition. If the right to self-determination based on ethnic identification 
were not enough, these territories have also claimed rights to independence based on 
historical and moral reasons. In “appealing to history, the de facto states claim that their 
current incarnation represents but the latest phase in a long tradition of statehood.”291 
Transnistria claims historical statehood from when it was an autonomous region in 
Ukraine before the Second World War whereas Armenia claims that Nagorno-Karabakh 
had autonomy under Persian rule. This appeal to historical precedent is useful; it helps 
justify past and present struggles and violence in order to establish claims for the future.  
Furthermore, “[a]ll the separatist authorities insist on an inherent moral 
entitlement to self-determination when faced with ‘alien’ and ‘imposed’ rule.”292 Some 
have attempted to claim statehood following the precedent set by Israel after World War 
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Two. They feel a sense of entitlement after having suffered genocide at the hands of their 
metropolitan states.  
However, despite fulfilling most requirements for statehood, these territories have 
been relegated to a condition of legal ambiguity with little hope for recourse in 
international law.
293
 At some point during most of these conflicts, “the separatists 
appealed to and begged the Russian Federation to be admitted into it. So far, only Crimea 
has become legally (and to a lesser extent, substantively) an exception. Unlike… other 
cases, it was promptly admitted and became reunited with the Russian Federation.”294 
However, these pseudo-states “are playing the long game, in which not losing means 
winning.”295  
Metropolitan states have firmly placed blame at these conflicts’ non-resolution 
with Moscow. According to Dov Lynch,  
Vasily Sturza, then the Moldovan presidential envoy to the negotiations with the 
PMR, made the point bluntly in July 2000: ‘The resolution of the conflict depends 
exclusively on the Russian Federation. Transnistria is an unrecognized state 
invented from nothing, invented by Russia. Without Russian political and 
economic support, this invention would not have been possible.’  
 
Similarly, an Abkhaz parliamentarian-in-exile in Tbilisi characterized all the post-Soviet 
conflicts not as civil wars but as “military-political conflicts between these new states and 
Russia.”296 Moscow has served an indispensible role in both aiding these separatist 
movements at their nascence and “ambiguity in Russian policy has done nothing to help 
resolve them since. The ‘Russia factor’ permeates these conflicts, with Moscow involved 
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at all levels and in myriad ways.”297 The concerted efforts to distribute Russian passports 
and claim citizens in these territories has further complicated these conflicts and given 
Moscow legal recourse in intervening in these areas, allowing for the “presence of 
Russian Armed Forces on the territory of a legally independent successor…”298 
 There does not appear to be much momentum towards changing the status quo in 
any of these conflicts, especially as many internal drivers help in perpetuating these de 
facto states. The leadership within these territories insist on preserving absolute 
sovereignty. They maintain that their states fulfill all necessary requirements for 
statehood as laid out in the Montevideo Convention of 1933. The Abkhazian president, 
Vladislav Ardzinba, said in 1999 “Statehood doesn’t need to be recognized by the 
international community. It is sufficient if it is declared by the people themselves.”299  
Each of the de facto states discussed in this thesis maintains “a system of 
organized political leadership with popular support and that provides basic governmental 
services to a given population over a specific territory over which effective control is 
maintained over a significant period of time.”300 While this is empirically true, the level 
of services provided by the central authority in each de facto state varies. Abkhazia 
maintains the daily running of three branches of government but is unable to provide 
social services to its population and depends on the support of the UN and NGOs. In fact, 
the amount of money brought in from international humanitarian aid organizations far 
exceeds Abkhazia’s total government budget. Furthermore, while the central authority 
maintains security services to defend its sovereignty, it is unable to ensure law and order 
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across its territory, especially in the Gali district. There are also competing security 
forces, including Russian troops, Georgian paramilitary groups, and armed ethnic 
minority groups that roam largely unchecked.
301
  
Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria, conversely, have much stronger central 
authorities. These territories have rebuilt some of their infrastructure since their conflicts 
in the early 1990s and the central security forces maintain effective control within the 
state and along its borders. That is not to say they are without problems. They also suffer 
from a total “collapse of industrial production, widespread… unemployment, and the 
deep impoverishment of their populations.”302 Despite their issues, each of these de facto 
states claim that their situations would improve if they were given the chance to operate 
as equal members of the international community.
303
 These territories are well aware that 
that their frozen conflicts are not over. War could conceivably resume at any moment. 
The de facto states perceive peace as a temporary thing and they know that while they are 
working just to survive, the metropolitan states are surpassing them militarily and 
economically.
304
  
The Abkhazian defense minister once remarked “‘The whole world helps the 
Georgian armed forces… Who is Georgia preparing to fight? Against Russia? No. 
Against Turkey? No. They are preparing to fight Abkhazia. All of the preparations are 
designed against Abkhazia.”305 In response, de facto states continue to prepare new 
generations for conflict. Universal male conscription is the rule rather than the exception. 
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It helps to socialize, integrate, and assimilate young men into the state’s culture. The 
persistence of a sense of existential threat has distorted the relationship between the civil 
and military aspects of government. Security services and the military largely dominate 
the political processes of these states, hurting economic and social development. 
Furthermore, the persistence of these conflicts has poisoned these populations against the 
international order and rule of law. Power and blunt force are seen as the only way to 
deter and to ensure survival. There is a marked distrust of the international community 
and of peacekeeping and reconciliation efforts, which hinders the resolution of these 
conflicts.
306
 
Another internal driver to the continuation of these conflicts is that these de facto 
states suffer from subsistence syndromes. They are all essentially failing or failed states 
that are able to maintain institutional fixtures of statehood but cannot provide basic 
services for their citizens. These territories are still trying to recover from the collapse of 
the Soviet system and the destruction of their infrastructure from the wars of the 1990s.  
The enduring threat of war has combined with economic mismanagement to 
produce hyperinflation, de-monetized economies, the collapse of social services, 
and the extensive criminalization of economic activities. These problems have 
been exacerbated by the legal limbo in which all of these de facto states exist, as 
nonrecognized strips of no-man’s-land.307  
 
There has been little progress made towards economic reforms in these states and many 
turn to illegal activities to survive. Dwindling and aging populations compound these 
issues.
308
 
While these internal drivers are significant, perhaps the most powerful causes for 
the perpetuation of these frozen conflicts are external drivers, including the actions of de 
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jure states, Russian intervention, and support by other nations and organizations. First, 
the actions of the metropolitan states have been detrimental to reconciliation. They each 
tried to forcibly restore their sovereignty and, when that failed, they have tried to 
repeatedly compel their separatist states through economic, political, and military 
means.
309
 
Second, Russia has played an integral role in the outbreak and continuation of 
these conflicts. As explained by Dov Lynch,  
Since the end of the wars, which the separatist forces won partly with Russian 
assistance, Russian policy toward these conflicts has retained enough ambiguity 
to reinforce the status quo and protect the de facto states. Russian engagement 
operates on several levels, illustrating the multifaceted role that Russia plays in 
contributing to the inertia surrounding these conflicts.
310
 
 
Russia maintains peacekeeping forces along the de facto borders of these separatist 
territories and continues to provide political and military support to some if not all of 
these states. Its peacekeeping forces and support for separatist movements in sovereign 
states played an important role in Russian strategy and, in many cases, initial 
peacekeeping forces in these frozen conflicts were drawn from Russian forces already in 
the conflict zone that provided support to separatist forces during these conflicts.
311
 As it 
stands, “Russian peacekeeping troops guard the new borders separating the parties. These 
new borders have allowed the separatist authorities to get on with state building while the 
presence of Russian troops deters the metropolitan states from large-scale aggression.”312 
This keeps these conflicts from achieving a resolution.  
The presence of these forces continues to undermine the faith of both the de facto 
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and metropolitan states in international peacekeepers and diplomacy. The UN and OSCE 
do not mandate Russian peacekeeping operations. The difference between Russian and 
international peacekeeping missions, according to Dov Lynch, is that  
…Russian operations are not deployed to advance ‘international peace and 
security,’ although this may be one of their declared secondary goals. According 
to Russia’s Military Doctrine, first enunciated in November 1993 and reiterated 
ever since, Russian operations are deployed to advance Russian state interests – 
this is their primary objective… Russian operations have consistently sought to 
alter the prevailing distribution of power in these conflicts in a way that would 
advance Russian state interests. In short, Russian forces are more players than 
referees. Moreover, Russia’s military presence has served to offset the weakness 
of the de facto state armed forces and exacerbated the weakness of the 
metropolitan armed forces. The balance of power on the ground is clearly 
strengthened in favor of the separatists… In addition, active Russian support of 
the separatist forces has reinforced Moldova’s and Georgia’s tendency to dismiss 
the legitimacy of the separatists, who are seen as the fifth column of an aggressive 
external power.
313
  
 
Russian peacekeepers operate in a very ad hoc manner. They do not follow standard rules 
of engagement, have no timetables for withdrawal, and repeatedly integrate warring 
parties into their forces. For instance, “In Moldova, the former 14th Army (now a much-
reduced Russian Operational Group) has adopted a peacekeeping role despite having a 
history of supporting Transnistrian separatist forces.”314  
Furthermore, the international community and NGOs help perpetuate these 
conflicts by providing funds and humanitarian support. In helping de facto states with the 
day-to-day running of their governments, they are preventing these territories from 
dealing with the realities of running a sovereign country and may be preventing them 
from seeking to reconcile with the state from which they separated.
315
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The longer these conflicts linger unresolved, the greater the potential that they 
will reignite and draw in outside actors. According to Dov Lynch, these conflicts have 
local, regional, and international implications.   
The separatist states have an impact on the security of the states from which they 
have seceded – the metropolitan states – and on wider regional developments. 
Close to two million people have been displaced by these wars, putting serious 
strain on the new states of Moldova, Georgia, and especially Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. The economies of these new states are all deeply affected by the 
existence of the unrecognized states. The self-declared states have presented 
external powers with opportunities to intervene in the region. Russia has used its 
peacekeeping operations in Moldova and Georgia as a means to retain influence 
over those two states. Conditions within the de facto states have exacerbated 
problems of organized crime in the post-Soviet space. The legal limbo in which 
they exist has made them breeding grounds and transit zones for international 
criminal activities.
316
 
 
Ultimately, it is impossible to quantify the social, humanitarian, political, and economic 
costs of the conflicts within the greater Black Sea region. Locally, these conflicts have 
prevented the development of economic infrastructure, stunted political growth and 
transparency, and caused states to invest heavily in their security apparatus at the expense 
of all other sectors of their states.  Furthermore, the legally ambiguous status of these 
states means that many are economically reliant on other countries and are thus beholden 
to them. Also, they look to illegal means to support their people, either by turning a blind 
eye to their citizens’ activities or by officially sanctioning them.  
Regionally, the continuation of these conflicts obstructs the creation of a 
comprehensive European order as well as the integration of willing nations
317
 Russian 
exploitation of these issues has served its geopolitical goals well and the West has been 
unable to find an effective strategy to counter Moscow. While the nations involved in 
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these conflicts, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Ukraine, perceive a clear 
delineation between the West or Russia, few are able to balance between the two 
effectively. However, many, like Georgia, are looking specifically to the United States 
for support. While the United States maintains many interests in the region, it is neither 
willing nor able to provide a security guarantee to these nations and pit itself against 
Russia, as Georgia disastrously learned in the 2008 war.  
These conflicts have also been detrimental to economic growth. Blockades 
between states in the Caucuses prevent the exploitation of natural trade routes. A 2000 
study by World Bank argued that opening borders within these states would increase 
Azerbaijan’s GDP by 5% and Armenia’s by 30% almost immediately. “In a region where 
macroeconomic stability has not led to improvement of people’s lives, the opening of 
borders for free trade could make a substantial contribution to the economic transition of 
these states and alleviate the general poverty of the population.”318  
 Internationally, these conflicts have put a strain on many of the major political 
and security organizations. NATO is unable to expand in nations where there are ongoing 
territorial disputes and the OSCE is seen as impotent as they have been unable to broker 
any lasting deal or reconciliation. Furthermore, any one of these conflicts, as seen in 
Crimea, has the potential of launching a regional war that could grow even larger and pull 
in international powers. “Conflicts that seem to be too remote geographically and too 
quiescent militarily to pose a threat to the wider international community are often more 
dangerous than they appear.”319  
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Resolution 
Legal Issues. “Fifteen new states arose from the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Recognized by the world and admitted into the club of states, they acquired the protective 
shield of a body of law developed expressly to protect states, with sovereignty as the 
foundational norm.”320 However, the promise of statehood was not applied universally 
among groups within the post-Soviet space. In addition to the fifteen post-Soviet states, 
five other “states” declared their independence following the dissolution of the USSR, 
Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria. The separatist 
movement in Chechnya within the Russian Federation was brutally crushed. However, 
the other four, paradoxically with Moscow’s blessing, have persisted, and despite 
achieving de facto statehood, they exist in a state of legal ambiguity and limbo. “If, in 
past centuries, there existed myriad forms of political organizations – from states to 
empires, city-states to dependencies – there are few shapes left at the start of the twenty-
first century. There are states, and there is little else.”321 Without the protection of legal 
statehood, these polities remain isolated with few to no rights. 
International norms and paradigms are unlikely to change, ensuring that these 
conflicts will find no recourse in international law. As a result, the de facto states of the 
greater Black Sea region have begun to perceive their situation as the result of a betrayal 
of the UN promise of self-determination.  
The UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples) of December 14, 1960 set forth 
many of the rules of the current regime. The declaration stated that all peoples 
have the right to self-determination and to determine freely their political status 
and forms of political, economic, and social development… Self-determination 
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became a legal and moral right to all non-self-governing territories that are 
distinct from the country that administers them.
322
 
 
The de facto states of the greater Black Sea region are legally lacking in only one thing 
for statehood, acceptance by other states. In remaining unrecognized, these states have 
little to no voice in the existing international framework, because only a sovereign nation-
state holds any rights or power. “De facto states raise the question as to whether the 
existence of the state is a formal condition proclaimed by outsiders, or a condition of 
effective governance of a defined territory, with a population that is accepting of being 
subject to that governance.”323  
In Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto 
States, Dov Lynch points out that there is a difference between the principle of the right 
to self-determination and the rules applying them. “The UN declaration denounced ‘any 
attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial 
integrity of a country.”324 Also noted by Lynch, this attempted to mitigate the effects of 
decolonization by  
…enshrining both a limited notion of self-determination and a juridical definition 
of criteria for new states…The rule was also expanded to include intrastate 
sovereignty: self-determination by all peoples was out of the question, and 
secession was condemned outright. The constant border changes and state 
territorial shifts that had been the fabric of international affairs until the middle of 
the twentieth century were condemned as illegal and disruptive to order.
325
  
 
What has emerged since has been an attempt to maintain the world’s borders as they were 
at the end of the Second World War. There are still many legal barriers to de facto states 
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and while they continue to be unrecognized by other sovereign nations, there is likely 
little recourse to their situation within international law.  
Moving Forward. The frozen conflicts that emerged in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, 
Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Crimea after the Cold War have been impervious to 
resolution. While some seem more likely to flare up than others, namely Crimea and 
Nagorno-Karabakh, it is unlikely that these conflicts will remain unresolved indefinitely. 
From 2014 to 2016, Crimea was annexed to Russia, Nagorno-Karabakh suffered the most 
border casualties since its ceasefire two decades prior, both Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
gained recognition of their independence by Russia and a handful of other states, and 
tensions between Transnistria and Moldova rose, in no small part because of Russian 
military activity within the region. Such heightened tensions over a short time period, 
coupled with fears of Western retrenchment, do not bode well for the future of these 
frozen conflicts. It would only take a small spark to ignite a conflagration that could 
entangle the entire region.  
Resolution of these conflicts will likely occur in one of three ways. First, there 
could be acceptance of the status quo whereby the separatist movement and de facto state 
will gain international recognition and be able to join the brotherhood of states. The 
longer these conflicts persist, the more likely this will be the outcome. Second, the de 
facto states, through military or political means, could be reabsorbed into their original de 
jure state. If this was the result of a concentrated diplomatic effort, it would require a 
much more concerted effort by outside organizations and states than is currently 
occurring. Reintegration through military means is also a possibility, though it would be 
more jarring geopolitically and would require significant development of military assets 
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and personnel by a metropolitan state. If Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, or Ukraine were 
to restore its sovereignty kinetically, it would likely disrupt the current balance of power 
in the region. Finally, a de facto state could be annexed to another state following the 
precedent set by Russia in Crimea. This seems unlikely, as only Transnistria has shown a 
consistent desire for annexation. Furthermore, annexation may ignite a larger regional 
conflict.  
In spite of these three options and the seeming paradigm shift by Russia in regards 
to how it treats separatist movements in its near abroad since 2014, the prospects for 
near-term resolutions to these frozen conflicts are dim. The underlying issues between the 
states involved will not resolve themselves organically and Russia is not likely to 
withdraw itself from each of these conflicts and states, despite increasing political and 
economic cost. At this time, the only way a solution will be reached is if one party 
forcibly changes the status quo militarily or if members of the international community 
are able to gather support to change the situation diplomatically. However, this would 
require Moscow to be in a position of significantly diminished power and influence.  
While the United States may be drawn into any of these conflicts, it currently only 
serves a diplomatic role. There is little hope of dislodging Russian influence in this 
region, though the United States can continue to gain stronger economic and political ties 
with the de jure metropolitan states and de facto separatist states and seek ways to foster 
reconciliation between them. It is in the United States’ best interests to invest its political 
and diplomatic capital wisely before these conflicts flare-up and potentially threaten its 
allies and interests.  
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